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THE ILL-ADVISED STATE COURT
REVIVAL OF THE McNABB-MALLORY
RULE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The McNabb-Maalloy rule once was described as a grenade which
fizzled.' Until a few years ago, this seemed an appropriate epitaph for
the discredited Supreme Court doctrine requiring exclusion of confes-
sions obtained by federal officers after an "unnecessary" delay in taking
an arrested person before a committing magistrate, regardless of the
confession's voluntariness. 2 Confusion 3 and trepidation 4 characterized
* Much of the research for this comment was done under the guidance of Fred E. Inbau,
John Henry Wigmore Professor of Law Emeritus at Northwestern University School of Law,
for the forthcoming third edition of F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS. He graciously consented to its use here, for which the author is grateful.
Thanks also to Professor James B. Haddad, also of Northwestern University, for his helpful
comments.
1 Kamisar, Fred E. Inbau: "The Importance of Being Guilty," 68 J. CRIM. L. & C. 182, 184
(1977).
2 The rule is named for two Supreme Court cases most commonly cited as delineating it.
In McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), the Court excluded confessions obtained
from several defendants after a prearraignment detention apparently lasting several days
marked by periods of prolonged questioning on the ground that this procedure violated the
predecessor statute to Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. That statute
directed that arrestees be brought before a committing magistrate without unnecessary delay.
In a controversial opinion, the Court held that convictions based on evidence obtained
through "such a flagrant disregard of the procedure which Congress has commanded cannot
be allowed to stand without making the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience
of the law." Id. at 345.
In Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), the Court attempted to clarify the
question of what constituted an unnecessary delay under Rule 5(a). Police arrested and de-
tained Andrew Mallory for approximately eight hours before attempting to locate a commit-
ting magistrate. The Court reversed lower court rulings of admissibility, holding that, while
time may be taken to "book" a suspect, id. at 454, a delay for the sole purpose of interrogation
where a committing magistrate is readily accessible constituted "willful disobedience of the
law." Id. at 453.
The confusion and controversy surrounding federal McNabb-Mallo cases have been well
documented elsewhere and are not the main concern of this comment. Among the most
comprehensive discussions of the problems and developments surrounding the McNabb-re-
lated cases are Hogan & Snee, The Mcabb-Mallog Rule: Its Rise, Rationale &Rescue, 47 GEO.
L.J. 1 (1958), and Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L.
REV. 442 (1948). See also Note, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1008 (1943); Note, Supreme Court Interpreta-
tion of Admissibility of Criminal Confessions, 40 ILL. L. REv. 273'(1945); Comment, Admissibility in
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the framing of the principle. Few states accepted it.5 Of those that did,
most diluted its effect in application.6 At the federal level, Congress re-
pudiated the rule in 1968.7
the Federal Courts of Confessions Obtained Prior to a Preliminary Hearing, 22 TEx. L. REv. 473
(1944); Comment, Prearraignment Interrogation and the McNabb-Maillo. Misma: A ProposedAmend-
ment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 68 YALE L.J. 1003 (1959).
For related cases applying McNabb,see Mitchell v. United States, 322 U.S. 65 (1944), and
Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948), noted, 29 B.U.L. REV. 250 (1948); 97 U. PA. L.
REV. 738 (1949).
3 The confusion was twofold. First, contrary to the assumptions of the Supreme Court in
McNabb, the defendants had been promptly arraigned and a conviction upon retrial was
upheld in McNabb v. United States, 142 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1944). Secondly, the statutes
upon which the McNabb Court relied grew out of policy considerations unrelated to those that
the Court attached to it. See Inbau, supra note 2, at 454-59.
4 Although some language in the McNabb opinion resembles the analysis in previous con-
stitutional cases, the Court expressly declined to give the rule full standing as a constitutional
requirement. 318 U.S. at 340-45.
5 Prior to 1972, only Michigan, Wisconsin, and Delaware professed to follow versions of
McNabb. See text accompanying notes 50-99 in/a.
6 Michigan and Wisconsin required the showing of a causal link between a confession
and the delay before granting a motion to suppress. See text accompanying notes 50-89 ina.
One court has termed the causation requirement a "mere reformulation of the voluntariness
test." Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 327, 384 A.2d 709, 716 (1978). See also Note, Illegal
Detention and the Adissibiliy of Confessions, 53 YALE L.J. 758, 764-65 (1944).
7 The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, was a
reaction to Supreme Court rulings in cases such as McNabb and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), which significantly raised the procedural and constitutional hurdles a prosecutor
faces in introducing confessions into evidence at trial. The Act reads:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of
Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in evi-
dence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial
judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the
trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in
evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue
of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the
jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into considera-
tion all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time
elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it
was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the
nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time
of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he
was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used
against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of
his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without
the assistance of counsel when questioned -and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above mentioned factors to be taken into
consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of the voluntariness of the
confession.
(c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a
confession made or given by a person who is a defendant therein, while such person was
under arrest or other detention in to custody of any law enforcement officer or law en-
forcement agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such per-
son before a magistrate or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with
offenses against the laws of the United States or of the District of Columbia if such
confession is found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and if the weight to
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In the 1970s, state courts renewed discussion of the rule. Since
1972, three states have embraced new versions of McNabb-Mallor, two of
them since 1977.8 Developments in other states indicate that more sup-
port is imminent. 9 An examination of federal and state experience with
the rule reveals that, in light of the constitutional protections currently
afforded arrestees, Mcabb-Malloy is an unnecessary evil.10
II. BACKGROUND: MCNABB-MALLORY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The federal experience with McNabb-Malloy provides a necessary
background for discussion of current state attitudes. In the 1943 case of
McNabb v. United States" and subsequent, related cases, 12 the Supreme
Court declared that a confession obtained by federal officials during a
prearraignment delay' 3 in violation of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and its predecessor statute' 4 was excludible from
be given the confession is left to the jury and if such confession was made or given by
such person within six hours immediately following his arrest or other detention: Pro-
vided; That the time limitation contained in this subsection shall not apply in any case in
which the delay in bringing such person before such magistrate or other officer beyond
such six-hour period is found by the trial judge to be reasonable considering the means of
transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available such magistrate or
other officer.
(Section (d) omitted).
For a discussion of congressional reaction to McNabb and of abortive pre-1968 attempts
to legislate regarding it, see Hogan & Snee, supra note 2, at 33-46.
8 Pennsylvania initially embraced the McNabb principle in 1972. Subsequent applica-
tions and modifications resulted in a strict per se rule that excluded all statements obtained
from suspects held for a period of six hours prior to arraignment. See text accompanying
notes 114-25 in/ra. Montana and Maryland adopted versions of the rule in 1977 and 1978,
respectively. See text accompanying notes 126-32 & 100-13 in/a.
9 See text accompanying notes 133-44 in/ia.
10 See text accompanying notes 145-216 in/ra.
11 318 U.S. 382.
12 See note 2 supra.
13 For the purposes of this comment, "prearraignment delay" will refer to the time elaps-
ing between arrest and the initial appearance of an arrested individual before a committing
official. Other labels for such an appearance used in various jurisdictions include "present-
ment," "preliminary hearing," and "preliminary examination." In the federal context, the
term should not be confused with the "arraignment" procedure mandated by Rule 10 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335, 338 n.2-
a (D.C. Cir. 1960).
14 Rule 5(a) and the rest of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure actually were not
adopted until the year following McNabb. In Malloqy, however, the Court characterized Rule
5(a) as a "compendious restatement, without substantive change, of several prior statutory provi-
sions" upon which it had relied in MciVabb. 354 U.S. at 452 (emphasis added). The Court
probably included this statement to quell controversy arising over the effect of the adoption of
Rule 5(a) when, soon after McNabb, the Advisory Committee to the Supreme Court on Crimi-
nal Rules dropped proposed Rule 5(b) from its Final Draft. Proposed Rule 5(b) read: "No
statement made by a defendant in response to interrogation by an officer or agent of the
government shall be inadmissible in evidence against him if the interrogation occurs while the
defendant is held in custody in violation of this rule." The statement in Malloq thus coun-
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evidence at trial, regardless of the confession's voluntariness.' 5 Rule 5 (a)
requires that an arrested individual be brought before the nearest avail-
able committing magistrate without unnecessary delay. 16 Under what
will hereinafter be called the pure federal rule, the nature and purpose
of the delay, rather than its effect on the defendant, was determinative
of exclusion.' 7
In McNabb the Court invoked the exclusionary rule to help enforce
compliance with (or at least discourage disregard for) Rule 5(a)'s prede-
cessor. Justice Frankfurter noted that such legislation "requiring that
the police must with reasonable promptness show legal cause for detain-
ing arrested persons. . . .outlaws easy but self-defeating ways in which
brutality is substituted for brains as an instrument of crime detection."' 8
tered the implication that, by approving the Rules without 5(b), the Supreme Court had
backed away from its McNabb holding.
15 Before McNabb, delay had little direct effect on the admissibility of a confession ob-
tained during the prearraignment period. Pre-McNabb confessions needed only to pass consti-
tutional muster as embodied in the due process test of voluntariness. See text accompanying
notes 140-47 infra. Under this analysis, the courts examined the "totality of the circum-
stances" in which the confession was obtained in order to ascertain whether it was "coerced"
or the product of an "overborne will." Id. See also Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957),
and Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949). The suspect's age, education, mental or physi-
cal condition, and previous experience with the criminal justice system are examples of perti-
nent circumstances. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191. Police conduct also weighs heavily in
the analysis. Torture, deprivation of food or sleep, isolation, and promises of leniency, each
might render a resulting confession involuntary and therefore inadmissible. Brown v. Missis-
sippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Usually courts cited the presence of several factors in combination
as constituting an improper totality, but a single, extreme circumstance, such as beatings or
prolonged, incessant questioning sessions, might alone suffice. Id.
Prior to McNabb, prolonged prearraignment delay was another circumstance to weigh,
carrying no more weight than other factors. For this reason, McNabb elicited surprise and
protest from law enforcement circles. See Inbau, sufira note 2. See also Hendrickson v. State,
93 Okla. Crim. App. 379, 398-400, 229 P.2d 196, 205-07 (1951).
16 At the time ofiMalloy, Rule 5(a) read:
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person
making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary
delay before the nearest available federal magistrate or before any other nearby officer
empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United
States. When a person arrested without a warrant is brought before a magistrate or
other officer, a complaint shall be filed forthwith.
The wording of this rule has since changed, but its fundamental meaning has not. See 18
U.S.C. Rule 5(a) (1975).
The function of Rule 5(a) is twofold. First, it is cautionary. During the arrestee's ap-
pearance, the magistrate apprises him, inter alia, of the charge against him and of his rights to
silence and counsel. Second, it is preventive, as it expresses a policy disfavoring lengthy prear-
raignment detention prior to neutral judicial examination of the grounds for holding the
suspect. Implicitly, this minimizes the opportunity for police misconduct toward the suspect.
17 Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. at 413. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals applied
the rule strictly. See Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Other federal
courts, however, were reluctant to give full force to the rule. See, e.g., United States v. Haupt,
136 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1943).
18 318 U.S. at 344.
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Allowing a conviction based on evidence obtained with "flagrant disre-
gard of the procedure which Congress has commanded . . . [would
make] the courts themselves accomplices to willful disobedience of the
law."' 19 The Court declined to incorporate the prompt arraignment rule
into a fifth and fourteenth amendment due process requirement binding
on the states as it subsequently did in other situations where it deemed
application of the exclusionary rule to be necessary. 20 Instead the Court
promulgated the McNabb-Mallog rule under its authority to supervise
procedure and evidence in the federal courts.21 The states, nearly all of
which have statutes similar to Rule 5(a),2 2 were invited but not required
to introduce such a rule in their criminal proceedings. State courts over-
whelmingly rejected the Supreme Court's approach.23
The lower federal courts struggled for years, issuing contradictory
opinions about the proper application of McNabb-Mallogy.24 Some courts
refused to believe that the Supreme Court had done any more than re-
state the voluntariness test for confession admissibility. 25 Others en-
forced the rule with enthusiasm, finding delays of as little as five minutes
to be unnecessary.26 Such decisions incited the Congress and the public,
who perceived the exclusion of reliable, voluntary confessions to be irra-
tionally solicitous of criminals at the expense of society.27
After several unsuccessful attempts to legislate against McNabb-Mal-
19 Id. at 354.
20 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (evidence obtained in violation of due
process held inadmissible in state criminal trials).
21 The basis for this power is unclear. McNabb marked the first time the Court made
extensive use of it. See generally Note, The Judge-Made Supervisogr Power of the Federal Courts, 53
GEO. LJ. 1050, 1051-56 (1965).
22 See notes 33-34 in/ta.
23 In State v. Gardiner, 119 Utah 579, 588-89, 230 P.2d 559, 564 (1951), the court rejected
McAabb-Mallo,7, reasoning:
Rules of evidence should aid the court in correctly determining the facts in the case
... .Excluding a confession because made while the maker was in custody and not
promptly taken before a magistrate would greatly hinder rather than aid the court in
correctly determining the facts, for there is nothing about being in custody in the absence
of coercion which would show any reason or motive for fabricating a confession.
See also notes 36-41 & accompanying text inca.
24 See notes 201-02 in/ta.
25 See, e.g., Ruhl v. United States, 148 F.2d 173, 175 (10th Cir. 1945). See also note 201
infra.
26 Alston v. United States, 348 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (five-minute delay violated Mc-
Nabb-Malloy). In Greenwell v. United States, the court wrote: "If the police detain an ac-
cused 'until he ha[s] confessed,' and only then, 'when any judicial caution ha[s] lost its
purpose,. . . arraign him,'. . . the confession is inadmissible no matter how much, or how
little, time was required to obtain it." 336 F.2d 962, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (quoting Mallory v.
United States, 354 U.S. at 455, and Muschette v. United States, 322 F.2d 989, 991 (D.C. Cir.
1963), rev'd on. other grounds, 378 U.S. 569 (1964)) (emphasis added).
27 See generally Note, Title II of the Omnibus Crime Bill- A Study of the Interaction of Law and
Politics, 48 NEB. L. REv. 193 (1968). See text accompanying notes 206-12 infra.
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loy, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
in 1968.28 The act codified the traditional due process-voluntariness test
as the primary determinant of confession admissibility in the federal
courts. Part (c) of the act mandates that a confession made by a suspect
in federal custody:
shall not be inadmissible solely because of a delay in bringing such a per-
son before a magistrate. . . if such confession is found by the trial judge to
have been made voluntarily and if the weight to be given the confession is
left to the jury and if such confession was made or given by such person
within six hours immediately following his arrest or other detention
29
This provision "more or less" repealed the MNabb-Malloy rule in the
federal courts.30 Congress could do this because the Supreme Court had
declined to base the decision on constitutional grounds.31 Although
some confusion about the impact of this act remains, McNabb-Malloy is
essentially dead in the federal courts.
III. THE MCNABB-MALLORY RULE IN THE STATE COURTS
Nearly every state has enacted a statute similar to Rule 5(a) re-
stricting prearraignment detention. 32 The precise terms vary by juris-
diction, although the term "without unnecessary delay" is the most
common. 33 Some statutes place a specific time limit on such delay.34
28 See note 7 supra.
29 Id.
30 Kamisar, supra note I, at 183. The federal courts inconsistently interpret the effect and
intended interaction of various provisions of the statute. For example, a finding of involunta-
riness, based solely on a delay of over six hours is arguably permissible under the statute
despite the language prohibiting the exclusion of a confession solely on the grounds of delay.
United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226, 1231-37 (9th Cir. 1970). See also United States v.
Keeble, 459 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1972). On the other hand, delays of over six hours have been
allowed under the statute as "reasonable" for reasons completely unrelated to problems of
transportation. See United States v. Marrero, 450 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1971); Comment, Admissi-
Lility of Confessions Obtained Between Arrest andAraqgnment: Federal and Pennsylvania Approaches, 79
DICK. L. REV. 309, 330-41 (1975). Generally, however, voluntariness is once again the con-
trolling test for confession admissibility in the federal courts.
31 For a discussion of congressional authority to supersede the Supreme Court's eviden-
tiary powers, seegenerally S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 53-63, repinted in [1968] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2139-50.
32 See statutes cited in notes 33-34 infra.
33 The following statutes or rules specify that an arrestee be brought before a committing
magistrate or similar official "without unnecessary delay," "with reasonable promptness," or
similar terms: ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.1 (but see corresponding statute ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-601
(1977) ("forthwith")); CAL. PENAL CODE § 849(a) (warrantless arrests), § 825 (West 1970)
(two day limit on prearraignment detention); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)(l); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-1() (West Supp. 1979) (warrantless); IDAHO CODE § 19-515 (1979); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 804.21-22 (West 1979); KAN. CRIM. CODE & CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 22-2901(1)-(2)
(Vernon 1970); ME. R. CRIM. P. 5(a); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.919 (1978); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 99-3-17 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-7-101(1), (2) (1978); NEV. REv. STAT. § 171.178(i),
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Warrantless, reasonable grounds arrests and arrests made pursuant to
warrants are often dealt with in separate statutes, although most do not
differ in the amount of delay allowed.35
All but six states thus far have rejected McNabb-Mallor as an en-
forcement tool for their own delay statutes. 36 A typical reaction is that
in Hendrickson v. State,37 where the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
rejected the rule, citing widespread academic disapproval, legislative at-
tempts to overturn it, the doubtful wisdom of extraconstitutional exclu-
sion, and the availability of alternate relief in the form of a criminal or
civil suit against the offending officer.38 The court castigated the
Supreme Court's decisions in McNabb-related cases:
The public is to suffer by reason of judicial legislation that. . . is so radi-
(ii) (1977); NEw MEX. STAT. ANN. § 31-1-5(b) (1978); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 120.90 (war-
rant), § 140.20 (warrantless) (1979); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 5(a); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 4(E)(1), (2);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 181 (West 1969); PA. R. CRIM. P. 122 (warrant), 130 (warrant-
less); TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 15.17 (Vernon 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-12-14
(warrantless), § 77-13-17 (warrant) (1978); VT. R. CRIM. P. 3(b) (warrantless,), 4(F)(2)(c)
(warrant); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1-5 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 970.01(1) (West 1971);
Wyo. R. CRIM. App. 5(a).
ALA. CODE § 15-10-7(e) (1975) specifies that an arrestee is to be taken before a commit-
ting official "forthwith" by a police officer after an initial arrest has been made by a private
citizen.
VA. CODE § 19.2-82 (1975) mandates that an arrestee be taken "forthwith" before a
magistrate in warrantless arrest situations, but where the arrest is on a warrant, § 19.2-80
(Supp. 1979) requires a hearing "without unnecessary delay."
34 The following statutes specify a particular time limit on prearraignment delay:
ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.150(a) (1972) (24 hours); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 4.1(a) (24 hours); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1909 (1979) (24 hours); FLA. R. GRIM. P. 3130 (24 hours); GA. CODE
ANN. § 27-212 (1972) (48 hours on warrantless arrests), § 27-210 (1972) ("without unneces-
sary delay" on arrests upon warrants); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 803-9(5) (1976) (48 hours); IND.
CODE ANN. § 18-1-1 1-8 (Burns Supp. 1980) (24 hours); Ky. R. GRIM. P. 3.02(2) (Supp. 1978)
(12 hours for warrantless arrests except in "exceptional" cases, then "without unnecessary
delay"); LA. CODE GRIM. PRO. ANN. art 229 (West 1967) (requires notification of District
Attorney within 48 hours), art. 230.1 (Supp. 1980) (limits detention to 72 hours prior to ar-
raignment); MD. DIST. R. 723(a) (Supp. 1980) (requires arraignment within 24 hours of ar-
rest); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 4.01;3.02(2)(3) (upon warrant, 36 hours), 4.02(5)(1) (warrantless, 36
hours); Mo. R. CRIM. P. 21.14 (requires discharge after 20 hours in warrantless arrests), 21.11
(requires appearance before a magistrate as "soon as practicable"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-410
(1974) (allows one night or longer "as the occasion may require so as to answer the purposes
of the arrest").
OR. REV. STAT. § 135.010 (1973) limits prearraignment delay to 36 hours, or 96 hours
for "good cause shown" or upon the defendant's request. The statute has been read not to
imply the remedy of exclusion if violated. States v. Jenks, 43 Or. App. 221, 602 P.2d 681
(1979).
35 See notes 33-34 supra.
36 A comprehensive list of state decisions rejecting McNabb-Malloly may be found in F.
INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION & CONFESSIONS 165 n.46 (2d ed. 1967) (1974
reprinting). Michigan, Wisconsin, Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Montana have
each adopted a version of McNabb-Mallor,.
37 93 Okla. Grim. App. 379, 229 P.2d 196 (1951).
38 Id. at 412, 229 P.2d at 211.
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cal a departure from the past as to seem inherently wrong where not initi-
ated by the people through the legislative branch of our government. The
sovereign is punished, which is an anomalous situation in a Democracy
S. .. The Accused is protected with abstract ethical reasoning eminently
satisfactory to the authors, and with high ethical purpose, but which the
subject has never practiced and ordinarily would hold in contempt. The
theoretical is dissolved in the searing light of experience.3 9
Similar sentiments were expressed in case after case rejecting McNabb-
Aalloy. In 1944, the Oregon Supreme Court derided the rule as plac-
ing unnecessary obstacles in the path of law enforcement: "It must be
remembered that at least one of the purposes of a criminal trial is to
bring murderers to justice."4 After these original rejections, most of the
states to reconsider the rule reaffirmed their repugnance for it.41
Although the federal MNabb-Malloq rule was introduced in 1943,
it was not until 1961 that Michigan became the first state to adopt the
same approach.42 In 1966, Wisconsin also promulgated a version of the
rule.43 Both of these states were irresolute in applying the rule. Dela-
ware developed a hybrid rule around its delay statute in 1965.44 The
movement stopped there. The faltering experimental versions in Michi-
gan and Wisconsin coupled with congressional abolition of the federal
rule convinced observers that the issue had been laid to rest.45
In 1972, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set forth its
own version of the rule.46 Its original form resembled the Michigan and
Wisconsin rules, but Pennsylvania modified and strengthened its rule.
By 1977,47 Pennsylvania adopted a strict per se rule banning all confes-
sions obtained during or after a six-hour delay in presentment before a
magistrate. Within a year, Maryland 48 and Montana 49 also adopted the
McNabb-Malloq principle. State versions of the MNabb-Mallot rule
39 Id. at 411-12, 229 P.2d at 211-12.
40 State v. Folkes, 174 Or. 568, 589, 150 P.2d 17, 25, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944).
41 See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 258 Ark. 110, 522 S.W.2d 413, cerl. denied, 423 U.S. 1017
(1975); People v. Lucas, 88 111. App. 3d 942, 948-49,410 N.E.2d 1040, 1044-45 (1980); State v.
Jenks, 43 Or. App. 221, 602 P.2d 681 (1979).
42 See text accompanying notes 50-72 in/a.
43 See text accompanying notes 73-89 in/a.
44 See text-accompanying notes 90-99 infra.
45 "Although the... Congressional abolition of the McNabb-Malloy rule affected only
federal cases, it will probably dissuade the state courts or legislatures from any further experi-
mentation with it." F. INBAU & J. RaID, supra note 36, at 168.
It should be noted however, that while the original rule, at least as applied in the District
of Columbia Circuit, contemplated almost no investigative delay, current state versions of the
rule recognize the necessity for at least some prearraignment interrogation. See note 26 sufra.
46 See notes 114-25 infa.
47 See notes 120-25 infa.
4 See notes 100-13 infa.
49 See notes 126-32 infra.
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have fallen into two general types: the causation form and the per se
form.
A. THE CAUSATION RULE: MICHIGAN AND WISCONSIN
The causation form of the McNabb-Mallog rule, as illustrated by the
approaches of Michigan and Wisconsin, is a schizophrenic rule. On the
one hand, an exclusionary rule based solely on delay is adopted, while
on the other exclusion applies only when the defendant proves a causal
connection between the delay and the challenged confession. This ap-
proach contains the seeds of its own dissolution and results from judicial
reluctance to apply the pure federal rule to voluntary confessions.
Michigan's experience with McNabb-Mallo is illustrative.
Michigan. The Hamilton Rule
At least some justices on the Michigan Supreme Court thought
they were adopting the pure federal rule in the unanimous decision in
People v. Hamilton .50 In that case a nineteen-year-old murder defendant
who could not speak English was held incommunicado for three days prior
to arraignment, during which police periodically interrogated him and
repeatedly denied his attorney access to him. The court found this delay
violated Michigan's delay statute, which required an arrestee to be
brought before a judicial officer "without unnecessary delay. '5 1 Al-
though the confession probably would have been suppressed under the
voluntariness test, the court instead cited the McNabb-Mllomy cases and
"inosculated" that reasoning to Michigan's statute.52 However, the fol-
lowing pivotal phrase left doubts as to how the court perceived the Mc-
Nabb-Maillo rule: "[A]n unnecessary and so unlawful delay of
compliance with. . .[Michigan's delay statute]. . . when done for pro-
longed interrogatory purposes and without proven justification of the
delay, renders involuntay and so inadmissible whatever confessional ad-
missions the detained person may have made while so unlawfully de-
50 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960).
51 Id. at 411, 102 N.W.2d at 739.
52 Id. at 415-16, 102 N.W.2d at 741-42.
Understandably, courts likely will select compelling cases to announce adoption of AMc-
Nabb-Malloy. See Comment, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review: Developments in Penmnylvania
Crn'mial Procedure: Confessions, 47 TEMPLE L.Q. 49, 54-55 (1973). This can create confusion
where later courts, reluctant to apply the rule in the absence of compelling (i.e., coercive)
circumstances, distinguish cases on that basis. Thus the rule becomes one aimed at coercion
rather than delay, which is the evil the statute aims to eliminate. See, e.g., People v. Harper,
365 Mich. 494, 503, 113 N.W.2d 808, 812 (1962), where the court admitted a confession
obtained after 121/ hours of interrogative prearraignment delay on the grounds that "none of
the circumstances which so strongly compelled our finding Hamilton's confession was invol-
untary is present in the case at bar." ee also RuhI v. United States, 148 F.2d 173, 175 (10th
Cir. 1945), for an example of the same reaction in the federal context.
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tained. '5 3 This language seems to promulgate an alternate test for
involuntariness, excluding confessions as involuntary where there has
been a prolonged delay for the purpose of interrogation. That the court
confused the McNabb-Malloy rule with the due process-voluntariness re-
quirement is further evidenced by the court's later statement that adop-
tion of the rule would "mean that constitutional due process means the
same thing in Michigan, to an arrested person, whether he is charged or
to be charged with violation of State or Federal law."54 This remark
exacerbated the confusion by invoking the state constitution as part of
the basis for statutory exclusion. Furthermore, the court's use of terms
like "renders involuntary" and "sweating"5 5 a confession left the possi-
ble impression that qualifying confessions were excluded where events
during the delay induced the confession, and that insufficient evidence
of causation would defeat an attempt at exclusion.
An alternate interpretation of Hamilton requires only that the delay
be prolonged and that the delay's purpose, rather than its effect, is to
induce a confession. A confession occurring during such a delay would
be excluded regardless of whether it actually was induced: in essence,
the pure federal rule. This reading would make the phrase "renders
involuntary" anomalous unless it is read to connote a legal conclusion
unaffected by any rebutting evidence of voluntariness. This reading
finds support in the court's professed intent to bring Michigan into line
with the Supreme Court and the federal rule.
In any event, this ambiguity probably produced the unanimity of
decision in the case; certainly later attempts to clarify it caused a sharp
division of the court. In the 1962 case of People v. McCager, the court
reaffirmed its adoption of the federal McNabb-Malloq rule in Hamilton.56
The first real split in the court over Hamilton's effect on voluntary
confessions occurred in the 1963 case of People v. Walker.57 Police held
the defendant for two days prior to his production in court on a habeas
corpus writ. The court dismissed the writ. Walker's confession had oc-
curred four days after the dismissal of the writ while he was still in cus-
tody. Nine days after his arrest, he was finally taken for a preliminary
hearing. By a four-to-four decision, the court upheld the admission of
53 359 Mich. at 417, 102 N.W.2d at 742 (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 418, 102 N.W.2d at 743.
55 Id. at 416, 102 N.W.2d at 742.
56 367 Mich. 116, 116 N.W.2d 205 (1962). Some doubt probably existed as to whether the
court had adopted McNabb-Malloq after its decision in People v. Harper. See note 52 supra. In
McCager, however, the court expressed no doubt about adoption but declined to apply it
where the delay took place while the suspect was in judicial custody following the dismissal of
a writ of habeas corpus.
57 371 Mich. 599, 124 N.W.2d 761 (1963).
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this confession at trial for lack of a majority to reverse.5 8 The upholding
decision relied on the dismissal of the habeas corpus writ to make
Walker's detention "prima facie legal." 59 Justice Souris dissented for
the four, writing that the erroneous dismissal of the writ meant that
police custody had never ceased, and so Hamilton applied.6 He deline-
ated the non-causal interpretation of Hamilton, distinguishing it from the
voluntariness test:
[Three] years ago this Court aligned itself with the United States supreme
court's exclusionary principle announced in. . . [McNabb] by barring the
courts of this State from participating in official illegality not limited only
to those instances in which official illegality extends to the point of physi-
cal or mental brutality or threats thereof. Such extreme misconduct al-
ways in this state resulted in exclusion of confessions obtained thereby on
the ground that they were involuntary. . . . In. .. [Hamilton] this Court
extended the bar to all confessions obtained during periods of illegal deten-
tion.6 1
This precise issue split the court again in People v. Ubbes62 two years
later. By a divided vote, the court affirmed a remand of the case for a
determination of the voluntariness of the defendant's confession al-
though half the court felt Hamilton rendered it inadmissible as a matter
of law. Prosecution witnesses admitted that police spent much of this
delay questioning the defendant to obtain a confession. The remanding
side opined, "The lapse of 161/2 hoursper se is not conclusive," and char-
acterized the questioning as "bona fide. . . to determine the immediate
issue of release or complaint, and complaint for what offense."'63 Justice
Souris, again writing in favor of exclusion, repeated the arguments he
had made in Walker. He noted the prosecution's admission as to the
purpose of the delay, and the fact that there was probable cause to
charge from the beginning.64
Ubbes illustrates the difficult choices courts face in implementing
McNabb-Malloq when an apparently voluntary confession falls under its
exclusionary rubric. In this case, those voting for possible admission
characterized a clearly prolonged interrogative delay as "bona fide" and
reasonable under the circumstances. 65 One has to suspect that the de-
terminative circumstance was the voluntary character of the confession
58 Id. at 604, 124 N.W.2d at 764.
59 Id. at 605, 124 N.W.2d at 764.
60 Id. at 617, 124 N.W.2d at 771.
61 Id. at 615, 124 N.W.2d at 769.
62 374 Mich. 571, 132 N.W.2d 669 (1965).
63 Id. at 576, 132 N.W.2d at 672.
64 Id. at 590-91, 132 N.W.2d at 679.
65 Justice Souris noted that such a characterization defied "even judicial credibility." Id.
at 592, 132 N.W.2d at 679 (Souris, J., dissenting).
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and its importance in the conviction. Since Hamilton, the Michigan
Supreme Court has not once invoked the case to exclude a confession.
In 1968, the court in People v. Farmer66 introduced a restricted for-
mulation of the Hamilton rule although it purported to follow precedent.
The new statement of the rule focused on a lack of coercive circum-
stances to determine that the purpose of a seventy-two-hour delay was
not improper. The important circumstance was that a physician had
examined and questioned the suspect concerning his treatment at the
hands of the police soon after confessing; thus the court found that lack
of coercion, rather than lack of interrogative purpose, took the confes-
sion out from under Hamilton.67 In a questionable use of precedent to
support its decision, the court cited the remanding opinion in Ubbes, but
quoted Justice Souris' dissenting characterization of the facts!6a In 1974,
the Michigan court eliminated any lingering notion that Hamilton oper-
ated independently of a delay's effect on the challenged confession, thus
providing some protection supplemental to the voluntariness test. In
People v. White69 the court, citing Farmer, unanimously held that a con-
fession given after a delay of thirty-four hours "was not the product of a
police interrogation. ' 70 The court said that Hamilton applied "only
where the delay has been used as a tool to extract a statement."' 7' This
formulation of the rule is so conceptually similar to the voluntariness
test that, in effect, Michigan is back where it started.72 Five years after
Michigan, Wisconsin embarked on a similar experiment.
Wisconsin: The Phillips Rule
The Wisconsin experience with delay exclusion resembles Michi-
gan's in that its test for an unreasonable delay, as applied, was indistin-
guishable from a voluntariness or coercion test. The initial rule was
introduced in the 1966 case of Phillps v. State.73 The state supreme court
held that the state's delay statutes and its due process clause limited the
66 380 Mich. 198, 156 N.W.2d 504 (1968). By this time justice Souris no longer sat on the
court.
67 Id. at 207, 156 N.W.2d at 508. Throughout the opinion, the court described the Hamil-
ton test as if it were a voluntariness test. "[Tihe test as to whether such a detention renders a
confession involuntary is not the reasonableness of the length of time a person is detained but
whether the detention has been used to coerce a confession." Id. at 205, 156 N.W.2d at 507.
68 Id.
69 392 Mich. 404, 221 N.W.2d 357, cert. denied, 420 U.S. 912 (1974).
70 Id. at 424, 221 N.W.2d at 366. Although two justices dissented on other grounds, they
expressly concurred in the delay analysis of the majority. Id. at 429, 221 N.W.2d at 374.
71 Id. at 424, 221 N.W.2d at 366.
72 In 1978, the Michigan Couri of Appeals wrote of Hamilton: "The question isn't one of
delay, but of whether the statement was voluntary or coerced." People v. Johnson, 85 Mich.
App. 247, 253, 271 N.W.2d 177, 179 (1978).
73 29 Wis. 2d 521, 139 N.W.2d 41 (1966).
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allowable interrogation of a suspect arrested without a warrant to that
which was "for the express purpose of determining whether to release
the suspect or. .. to make a formal complaint. '74 The court reasoned
that legitimate interrogation of a person arrested upon a warrant was
more limited because the warrant "would seem to presuppose sufficient
evidence and its purpose is to cause the arrested person to be brought
before a magistrate. ' 75 Detention for a longer period rendered inadmis-
sible any confession obtained during the unreasonable portion 76
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has never used Philhos to exclude a
confession; in Phillps itself the confession was admitted under the test
promulgated by the court. 77 Despite repeated declarations that the vol-
untariness of a confession is not the issue under Phillips,78 examination
of the factors used to determine the reasonableness of delays in later
cases belies the disclaimers. In State v. Schoffer, 79 the court said that
"[t]he readiness of [the defendant]. . . to give information about a large
number of crimes affects the determination of reasonableness of the de-
lay." The kinds of confessions excludible under Philh'ps purportedly are
those obtained where police delay in order to "sew up"80 a conviction or
arrest; yet in Krueger v. State8' the court refused to exclude a confession
even though police had sufficient evidence to charge the defendant
before he confessed some fourteen hours after his arrest. "The question
revolves solely on the point whether the delay is inordinate and the de-
tention illegal," declared the court.82 But again, in later cases, the crite-
ria for inordinate or illegal delay resembled those for voluntariness. For
example, in Wagner v. State83 the court reasoned that "the police did not
detain Wagner in order to subject him to a strong inquisitorial attack,
74 Id. at 534, 139 N.W.2d at 47.
75 Id. This reasoning is curious in that it requires a conclusion that judicial examination
of the grounds for detention is less urgent when the court has made no predetention determi-
nation of probable cause.
76 Id.
77 The court did indicate that a 51-hour prearraignment delay in State v. Burke, 30 Wis.
2d 324, 140 N.W.2d 737 (1966), would probably be held unreasonable, but declined to apply
Phillips retroactively to the confession in that case. Cf. McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 596, 223
N.W.2d 521 (1974), where the court construed circumstances to justify a five-day delay as
reasonable.
78 In Phillips itself, the court wrote, "The McNabb-Malloy rule is basically an exclusionary
rule not based upon any constitutional right of the accused or involuntariness of the confes-
sion." 29 Wis. 2d at 531, 139 N.W.2d at 45. Se alsro State v. Wallace, 59 Wis. 2d 66, 75, 207
N.W.2d 855, 860 (1973); Krueger v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 345, 357, 192 N.W.2d 880, 886 (1972).
79 31 Wis. 2d 412, 434, 143 N.W.2d 458, 468 (1966).
80 Phillips v. State, 29 Wis. 2d at 535, 139 N.W.2d at 47.
8t 53 Wis. 2d at 357, 192 N.W.2d at 885-86. See also Briggs v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 313, 323-
24, 251 N.W.2d 12, 16-17 (1977).
82 53 Wis. 2d at 357, 192 N.W.2d at 885-86.
83 89 Wis. 2d 70, 277 N.W.2d 849 (1979).
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. . . therefore the period of [his twenty-seven-hour] detention was not
unreasonably long."18 4 The length of the delay did not seem to be an
important factor in the unreasonableness analysis. Language in other
cases indicates that police could "reasonably" detain a prisoner for as
long as they felt interrogation might turn up any evidence at all.8 5
Recognizing these basic inconsistencies, the court in Klonowski v.
State reviewed the Ph'l/~s line of cases and wrote:
While these cases indicate that any confessions made during an unreasona-
bly long detention are inadmissible, there are cases stating that the purpose
of the rule is to prevent an accused from having his resistance weakened by
the psychological coercion of being detained and "worked upon" by the
police to secure evidence.86
Citing the "extraction" test from the Michigan cases on Mcabb-Mal-
1oy, 8 7 the court concluded that the confession at hand, obtained after a
twenty-four-hour delay, was "not subject to the exclusionary rule under
Philhzs for two reasons: First, it was a volunteered statement. . . and
second, it was not the result of the defendant's being 'worked upon' by
the officers in order to obtain a 'sew up' confession."88 In effect, the
court held that no confession was excludible under Phillips unless it was
also excludible under the voluntariness test, i.e., the delay or police con-
duct during the delay must have caused the confession.89
In both Michigan and Wisconsin, the introduction of a causal re-
quirement diluted their versions of McNabb-Mallo7 to meaningless dicta.
A reading of the cases suggests that the primary corrosive force was judi-
cial reluctance to exclude voluntary confessions. Whether this was
based on a concern for public or legislative response, or for effective law
enforcement, at base the price was simply too high when it came time to
84 Id. at 80, 277 N.W.2d at 854.
85 See State v. Hunt, 53 Wis. 2d 734, 742, 193 N.W.2d 858, 864 (1972), where the court
noted that "Postarrest detention should be permitted as long as the purpose is reasonable and
the period of detention is not unjustifiably long." The court carefully examined and upheld
the reasonableness of separate portions of a two-day delay. One 15-hour segment of interro-
gation was "reasonable" because, although the police had insufficient evidence to charge the
defendant, they might have jogged his memory regarding the identity of other suspects. The
more probable purpose of the delay was to "break" the defendant's alibi.
Seegeneral y State v. Francisco, 257 Wis. 247, 43 N.W.2d 38 (1950) (pre-Philips discussion
of unreasonable delay under the voluntariness test).
86 68 Wis. 2d 604, 610, 229 N.W.2d 637, 640 (1975) (emphasis added).
87 See note 71 & accompanying text supra.
88 68 Wis. 2d at 611, 229 N.W.2d at 641.
89 In State v. Brown, 50 Wis. 2d 565, 570, 185 N.W.2d 323, 326 (1971), the court said
"[I]n Phillips v. State. . .an unreasonable. detention gave rise to an exclusionary rule. . . on
the theory the unreasonableness conclusively caused the accused to react as he did as a matter
of law." Thus, in practice, the Wisconsin courts construed "unreasonableness" as "coercive-
ness." As the cases discussed above show, they did not apply the rule as a conclusive matter of
law, but rather as an easily rebutted presumption through a process analytically indistin-
guishable from the voluntariness test.
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reverse the convictions of confessed criminals. Courts considering adop-
tion of this form of McNabb-Mallo should note the probability of its
erosion. A causation-based rule invites confusion with the voluntariness
test. It promotes contradictory appellate decisions. If the Michigan-
Wisconsin experience is any guide, adoption results in little, if any, addi-
tional protection for an arrestee over the voluntariness test. It is a waste
of judicial time.
B. THE PER SE RULE: DELAWARE, PENNSYLVANIA, MARYLAND, AND
MONTANA
Any meaningful application of Mcdabb-Malloy must exclude a cau-
sation requirement. Exclusion must be based on a violation of the appli-
cable delay statute per se. If the statute provides specific time limits,
implementation is easy. But if the standard is "unnecessary" or "unrea-
sonable" delay, administrative problems arise. These terms, with their
myriad legal connotations and definitions, present a dilemma to police
officers on the street. Naturally the policeman will desire a particular
time period within which he may safely question a suspect to obtain a
voluntary confession. Such a guide would provide certainty to enhance
the interrogative process generally. It also ensures that some voluntary
confessions that might have been obtained afterwards will never occur.
However, an adopting state must be willing to tolerate this.
Delaware: The Vorhauer and Webster Rules
One place to find a logical cut-off point for permissible delay is the
delay statute itself. Because any objective limit will be arbitrary, a court
might well look for guidance to the legislative standards set forth in the
statute it purports to enforce. The Delaware Supreme Court did this in
the 1965 case of Vorhauer v. State.9° Delaware's delay statute mandates
that "every person arrested shall be brought before a magistrate without
unreasonable delay, and in any event he shall, if possible, be so brought
within 24 hours of arrest ... ."91 In Vorhauer, the court concluded that
a confession obtained more than twenty-four hours after arrest was auto-
matically inadmissible, noting that the exclusionary rule is "the most
practical and effective means" to enforce the statute.92 Two months
later in Webster v. State93 the court held that confessions obtained before
90 59 Del. 35, 212 A.2d 886 (1965). The Delaware law on prearraignment delay prior to
Vorhauer appears in Wilson v. State, 49 Del. 37, 109 A.2d 381 (1954). See also Lasby v. State,
55 Del. 145, 185 A.2d 271 (1962).
91 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1909 (1974). This statute is essentially unchanged since the
Vorhauer ruling.
92 59 Del. at 47, 212 A.2d at 893.
93 59 Del. 54, 213 A.2d 298 (1965).
[Vol. 72
McNABB-MALLORY REVIV4L
the twenty-four-hour mark, but after an "unreasonable" delay, were
similarly excludible. The court said there were "no clear cut standards
of reasonableness" and emphasized that the question was strictly eviden-
tiary, to be decided solely by the trial judge in each case.94
The court offered few clues as to where the judge should look in
making that determination. However, one clue is that the Webster court
allowed a confession obtained more than four hours after the arrest,
largely on the grounds that the police treated the suspect well during
that time. They spent a large part of the delay complying with requests
of the accused. 95 Webster indicates that police conduct plays an impor-
tant part in the reasonableness of a pre-twenty-four-hour delay, and that
a court will scrutinize such actions for coercive impact.96 In Fullman v.
State97 the court approved a twenty-one-hour delay and admitted the
resulting confession where part of the delay was attributable to the de-
fendant's request for a polygraph examination, and where "an atmos-
phere of cordiality and mutual trust permeated the surroundings."98
Again the pertinent circumstances were those indicating the presence or
absence of undue pressure or mistreatment. Thus the door is open in
Delaware for dilution of the rule to the causation form for delays of less
than twenty-four hours. 99 As for the automatic twenty-four-hour rule,
no qualifying cases have been reported at the appellate level since
Vorhauer. Either Delaware police have had little difficulty coping with
the requirement, or those cases where problems have arisen have not
prompted reconsideration of the rule by an appellate court.
94 Id. at 59, 213 A.2d at 301.
95 Id. at 60, 213 A.2d at 301.
96 Compare Wilson v. State, 49 Del. 37, 109 A.2d 381, where coercive factors determined
the reasonableness of a prearraignment delay under the pre-Vorhauter "totality of circum-
stances" test.
97 389 A.2d 1292 (Del. 1978), overmled on other grounds, 400 A.2d 292 (Del. 1979).
98 Id. at 1298.
99 Some cases, however, indicate that the Delaware rule may retain its own distinct vital-
ity as more than an echo of the voluntariness test. In Warren v. State, 385 A.2d 137 (Del.
1978), the court declared that a customary eight-hour delay for all drunken driving arrestees
was unreasonable although the custom stemmed from a desire to prevent the defendant from
being prejudiced by his drunken demeanor in court. Coerciveness was not a factor in the
decision. The court perceived the uniform delay to be unreasonable because of its arbitrari-
ness, and required that in each case the arresting officer take the arrestee before a judge as
soon as he reasonably deemed the danger of in-court prejudice to be minimal, i.e., when the
defendant sobered sufficiently to protect his own interests. The court remanded the case for a
determination of the reasonableness of the eight-and-one-half-hour delay in Warren's arraign-
ment to decide the admissibility of statements he made during that time.
See alo Priest v. State, 227 A.2d 576 (Del. 1967), where the court volunteered that the
admissibility of a confession might have been challenged under Webster although it was not
argued on the appeal. But see Parson v. State, 222 A.2d 326 (Del. 1966), cerl. denied, 386 U.S.
935 (1967); Weekly v. State, 222 A.2d 781 (Del. 1966), where voluntariness factors were deter-
minative in admitting delayed confessions.
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Mayland The Johnson Rule
Maryland, where prearraignment delay is limited to twenty-four
hours by a rule of court, l ° ° adopted an exclusionary rule identical to
Delaware's in 1978. After the most thorough examination of the delay
problem made in any recent state decision, the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals ruled in Johnson v. State' 0 l that any confession obtained after the
statutory period was inadmissible "irrespective of the reason for the de-
lay." Practices justifying a shorter delay included administrative proce-
dures, determination of whether to issue a charging document,
verification of the commission of the crime, procurement of information
to avert harm to persons or property, and obtaining nontestimonial in-
formation as to the identity or location of other persons involved in the
offense.'0 2 The court rejected the majority approach of the states:
To say that an unlawful postponement of the initial appearance may be
merely a factor in assessing the admissibility of a statement, is to imply
that an unnecessary delay may be overlooked entirely if other indicia of
voluntariness exist. Under this analysis, even a gross violation of the pre-
sentment requirement may be disregarded altogether . . . . Despite its
relatively popular acceptance, therefore, the voluntariness standard is a
hopelessly inadequate means of safeguarding a defendant's right to prompt
presentment. 103
The court also perceived that the Michigan form of MNabb-Malloy was
"merely a reformulation of the voluntariness test."' 0 4
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Orth contended that the majority's rul-
ing bestowed
full constitutional import to the right of an arrestee to be promptly taken
before a judicial officer. It makes the right the equivalent of the constitu-
tional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures and self-in-
crimination ...
[T]he most eFective protection of a nonconstitutional right is not the
sole goal of criminal justice. There is also to be considered the protection
of the right of society to have a person who has committed offenses against
100 MD. DIsT. R. 723(a) (Supp. 1978) read:
A defendant who is detained pursuant to an arrest shall be taken before a judicial officer
without unnecessary delay and in no event later than the earlier of (1) 24 hours after
arrest or (2) the first session of court after the defendant's arrest upon a warrant or, where
an arrest has been made without a warrant, the first session of court after the charging
document has been filed. A charging document shall be filed promptly after arrest if not
already filed.
The 1980 supplement version of the Maryland District Rule is more succinct: "A defendant
who is detained pursuant to an arrest shall be taken before a judicial officer without unneces-
sary delay and in no event later than 24 hours after arrest. A charging document shall be
filed promptly after arrest if not already filed." MD. DIsT. R. 723(a) (Supp. 1980).
101 282 Md. 314, 384 A.2d 709 (1978).
102 Id. at 329, 384 A.2d at 717.
103 Id. at 325, 384 A.2d at 715.
104 Id. at 327, 384 A.2d at 716.
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it answer for his acts according to the law of the land. 10 5
The court excluded Johnson's confession despite evidence that his illness
had caused much of the delay.10 6 Thus the case provides no support for
those who would attempt to distinguish later cases on the basis of their
facts. State courts re-examining the McNabb-Malloy rule in the future
should look to the carefully draftedJohnson opinion for guidance. The
thorough analysis in both the majority and dissenting opinions will
make it a leading case on the issue.
Subsequent applications of the rule in Maryland reflect the troub-
ling consequences of a decision to implement delay-based exclusion
firmly. Lower court opinions evince the sincere doubts and reluctance
of the judges who must apply it. 107 The courts have held the rule inap-
plicable to cases where delayed statements are used only for impeach-
ment purposes, 08 and where the confessor was already legally under
detention for a different crime. 10 9 One case has upheld a "waiver of
rights" form for Johnson rights. 110 Others have carefully formulated a
precise and restrictive definition of arrest to aid in tolling the delay
timeclock. 111 Significantly, the reasonableness test for pre-twenty-four-
hour confession has retained its integrity in the first two years of its ap-
plication.112 Still the administrative problems of such a nebulous test
may yet force its erosion. 113
The time-based per se form of McNabb-Malloq makes the most sense
105 Id. at 340-41, 384 A.2d at 723-24 (Orth, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
106 Id. at 317-18, 384 A.2d at 711-12.
107 The excerpt below poignantly reflects the agonized tone of a judge forced to apply a
rule he simply cannot condone:
Even assuming the delay was intentionally contrived to elicit the culpatory remark, the
sanction of suppressing the truth is hard tojustify as proper punishment for the tardiness
in formally [judicially] apprising appellant why he was being held. In light of the com-
pletely voluntary nature of the admission of such despicably cruel conduct to a six-year-
old child, the equal dispensation of procedural rights for technical rule violations is not
always understandable. But justice must be equally dispensed, not distributed selec-
tively. Despite its appearance of burning the barn to get rid of the mice, the judgment
must be reversed and the case remanded for retrial.
Shope v. State, 41 Md. App. 161, 171, 396 A.2d 282, 288 (1979). Ste also Meyer v. State, 43
Md. App. 427, 406 A.2d 427 (1979), where the court found the disclosure of ajohnson viola-
tive confession to the jury to be "harmless error." Voluntary confessions are rarely held as a
matter of law to have had no effect on a jury verdict.
108 Harris v. State, 42 Md. App. 248, 400 A.2d 6 (1979).
109 Chaney v. State, 42 Md. App. 563, 402 A.2d 86 (1979).
110 Logan v. State, 45 Md. App. 14, 410 A.2d 1110 (1980).
111 See Kennedy v. State, 44 Md. App. 662, 410 A.2d 1097 (1980); Davis v. State, 42 Md.
App. 546, 402 A.2d 77 (1979).
112 See, e.g., Shope v. State, 41 Md. App. 161, 396 A.2d 282 (1979), where a nine-and-one-
half-hour delay was held unreasonable.
113 Despite its resolve to apply McNabb-Malloqy meaningfully under a reasonableness stan-
dard, administrative problems forced Pennsylvania to adopt a relatively short, time-based
standard. See text accompanying notes 114-25 infra.
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administratively once a court decides to adopt at all. Maryland and
Delaware concluded this, and specific time limits in their delay statutes
aided in measuring permissible delays.
Pennsylvania: From the Futch Rule to the Davenport Rule
Pennsylvania's delay statute does not specify a maximum hour
limit, but rather prohibits "unnecessary" delay.114 Thus, in its first ap-
plication of Mclabb-Mallo principles, Commonwealth v. Futch,115 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court banned all evidence obtained after an un-
necessary delay except where no reasonable relationship existed between
the delay and the evidence. Later courts had to decide what constituted
an unnecessary delay and what comprised a reasonable relationship.
Both ambiguities represent holes through which all but coerced confes-
sions might escape exclusion. Evidently the court recognized the prob-
lem as subsequent cases reflected a concern for maintaining the rule's
integrity. 116 In Commonwealth v. Williams, 117 the court refined the Futch
analysis to three steps: the delay must be unnecessary, the evidence
must be prejudicial, and the incriminating evidence must be related to
the delay. The Williams decision went further to declare that "prear-
raignment delay will always be unnecessary unless justified by adminis-
trative processing-fingerprinting, photographing and the like."'1 18 Still
the test was so general that defendants flooded the court's docket with
appeals seeking judicial examination of the necessariness of prearraign-
ment detentions."19
The court bowed to the pressure for a consistent way to administer
the rule in the 1977 case of Commonwealth v. Davenport,120 under which all
114 PA. R. CRIM. P. 122, 130 (1979).
115 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972). Futch is also significant in that it excluded a line-up
identification, a practice followed by California courts. People v. Williams, 68 Cal. App. 3d
36, 137 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1977). Other courts adopting McNabb-Mallo,7 have differed on the line-
up issue. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 50 Wis. 2d 565, 185 N.W.2d 323 (1971).
Pre-Futch Pennsylvania law on the admissibility of confessions is exemplified by Com-
monwealth v. Koch, 446 Pa. 469, 288 A.2d 791 (1972), a case decided only two months prior
to Futch. In Koch, delay merely constituted a factor in a voluntariness analysis.
116 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 245, 301 A.2d 701, 702 (1973), where
the court emphatically affirmed Futch and excluded a confession obtained after a 21-hour
delay. Accord, Commonwealth v. Cherry, 457 Pa. 201, 321 A.2d 611 (1974) (14-hour delay
disapproved). See aiso note 117 infra.
117 455 Pa. 569, 319 A.2d 419 (1974). In this case, the Pennsylvania court's determination
to prevent dilution of the rule surfaced in its specific disapproval of the practice of delaying
arraignment to check a defendant's story, a purpose most courts assume to be reasonable. See,
e.g., Quinn v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 101, 183 N.W.2d 64 (1971); and note 191 & accompanying
text in/fa.
118 455 Pa. at 573, 319 A.2d at 421.
119 The court decided at least 14 cases on the issue between 1973 and 1975. Common-
wealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 286 n.7, 370 A.2d 301, 306 n.7 (1977).
120 471 Pa. 278, 370 A.2d 301 (1977).
McNABB-MALLOR Y REVIVAL
confessions obtained during or after a prearraignment delay of more
than six hours are automatically excluded. 12' For shorter delays, the
court did not bother with an illusory reasonableness standard, but
rather held that "prearraignment delay shall not be grounds for sup-.
pression of such statements except as may be relevant to constitutional
standards of admissibility."' 122 Breaking with all precedent, the court
declared that the significant period to measure was that between arrest
and arraignment, not between arrest and confession. Justice Roberts
explained:
This rule was adopted not simply to guard against the coercive influence of
custodial interrogation, but to ensure that the rights to which an accused is
entitled at preliminary arraignment are afforded without unnecessary de-
lay. . . . T]he exclusion. . . of statements made during the illegal delay
in producing a person before a magistrate. . . is premised not only on the
possible coercive effect of the delay itself, but on the postponing of the
additional rights which attach on production.123
Under this rule, even confessions given well within a reasonable period,
such as during administrative processing, are exlcuded if the total prear-
raignment period exceeded six hours. 124
Davenport applied only to prospective arrests, and no post-Davenport
arrests have been reported in appellate cases to date. Although this ex-
ceedingly strict rule has yet to be tested, the court hinted at some flex-
ibility in a footnote: "We recognize that it is difficult to fix any time
limit. Nevertheless, we conclude that it is desirable to set such a stan-
dard, and that six hours provides a workable rule which can readily be
complied with in the absence of exigent circumstances.'1 25 As the court be-
gins working with the rule, where and how it recognizes such exigent
circumstances will shape its future effectiveness.
Pennsylvania's experience suggests that the successful administra-
tion of McNabb-Mallor requires a specific time limit. Yet in the same
year Pennsylvania established such a limit, Montana adopted McNabb-
Aalloy without one.
121 To support its choice of this particular time period, the court cited § 4.5 of the Correc-
tions, STANDARDS AND GOALS OF THE NATIONAL ADvISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (1973), and the ALl MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 130.2
(1975). See also id § 150.3. Curiously, the court failed to mention the similar time limit
promulgated by Congress in the Omnibus Crime Act of 1968. See note 7 .nipra.
122 471 Pa. at 286-87, 370 A.2d at 306.
123 Id. at 284, 370 A.2d at 305.
124 But see Commonwealth v. Van Cliff, 483 Pa. 539, 397 A.2d 1173 (1979), where a pre-
Davenport arrestee's oral confession obtained two-and-one-half hours after arrest and a tran-
script of the confession made three hours later were admissible although arraignment took
place 17h hours after arrest. This case was decided after Davenfiort but before it took effect.
125 471 Pa. at 286 n.7, 370 A.2d at 306 n.7.
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Montana: The Benbo Rule
The Montana Supreme Court, relying heavily on the Pennsylvania
court's reasoning in Commonwealth v. Futch, announced in the 1977 case
of State v. Benbo126 that it too would exclude all evidence obtained during
an unnecessary delay in arraignment unless the evidence was unrelated
to the delay. The court expressly declined to promulgate a particular
time standard, 127 and the Montana delay statute specifies none. 128 No
case has arisen to test the Benbo rule. 129 The court did, however, suggest
a series of steps for challenging a confession under Benbo. The defendant
must show that unnecessary delay occurred (unnecessariness being a
function of the arresting officer's diligence and the time elapsing before
arraignment), then the prosecution must prove the delay was not rea-
sonably related to the confession to avoid exclusion.' 30 The court then
excluded statements made by the arrested defendant while he spent sev-
eral days helping police locate incriminating evidence and where no ef-
fort was made to take the defendant before a judge as required by
statute.131
After Benbo, Montana is in a unique position to test McNabb-Mal-
o1y. The retention of a reasonable relationship requirement may erode
the rule into a causation form. The reliance on Pennsylvania precedent,
however, may lead Montana to promulgate a time limit, such as that in
Commonwealth v. Davenport.132
IV. THE ADOPTING DECISION
Thus far, this comment has compared the relative merits of existing
state versions of McNabb-Mallory. The threshold question remains, how-
ever, whether to adopt it at all. The overwhelming majority of states
still reject McNabb-Mallory. Yet if attempts in Maryland, Pennsylvania,
126 174 Mont. 252, 570 P.2d 894 (1977).
127 "While the length of the time between arrest and initial appearance is not determina-
tive of the 'necessity' of the delay, it is a factor to be considered." 174 Mont. at 262, 570 P.2d
at 900.
128 REv. MONT. CODE §§ 95-901(a), 95-603(d) (3) (1947) require that an arrested person be
brought before the nearest and most accessible judge without unnecessary delay.
129 Although no appellate case has implemented Benbo, the supreme court suggested that
the rule might have applied in State v. Lenon, 174 Mont. 264,570 P.2d 901 (1977), where the
accused was arrested midnight Friday, confessed at nine a.m. Saturday, and was arraigned
Monday morning. The police tried several times to contact one justice of the peace but found
he was out of town. They did not seek out any of the other competent officials in the vicinity.
The court held that this delay would be unnecessary, but that, in failing to show that another
justice of the peace was available at the time, the defense had not made a proper case for
suppression of the confession. Id. at 275, 570 P.2d at 908.
130 Id. at 262, 570 P.2d at 900.
131 Id. at 255-56, 570 P.2d at 896-97.
132 See notes 114-25 & accompanying text supra.
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and Montana are successful, more states may reconsider their stands.
Indeed several jurisdictions show signs of wavering. For example, the
West Virginia Supreme Court declared recently in State v. Mason 133 that
its statute requiring arraignment without unnecessary delay is
"mandatory," not merely "directory." Such language usually indicates
a state's willingness to adopt McNabb-Maloy.13 4 In State v. Cand, how-
ever, the court said failure to comply with the statute "does not necessar-
ily vitiate a confession obtained pursuant to a legal arrest. . .[citing
Mason] but when non-compliance is combined with an illegal arrest, ex-
clusion is the only remedy to insure. . . constitutional protections."'135
No subsequent cases clarify whether the Candy court reversed or merely
qualified West Virginia's apparent inclination to adopt McNabb-Malloy.
Other states are wavering. In Florida, the supreme court appar-
ently adopted McAabb-Mallo, in 1971.136 Lower courts, however, do
not recognize this adoption, and the supreme court has yet to disabuse
them of this notion. 137 In Illinois the supreme court has called for legis-
lative action because of frequent disregard for the state's delay statute
and perceived inadequacy of the traditional due process-voluntariness
approach in stemming it.138 The court intimated that it might review
its decision to reject McNabb-Malloy.139 California has adopted a rule
excluding identifications in line-ups held during an illegal delay al-
133 249 S.E.2d 793, 797 (W. Va. 1978).
134 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 282 Md. at 321, 384 A.2d at 713.
135 252 S.E.2d 164, 168 (W. Va. 1979). Seegenerally Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200
(1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 390 (1975).
136 In Milton v. Cochran, 147 So. 2d 137, 141 (Fla. 1962), the court noted, "We should be
derelict in our duties if we did not here point out that continued violation of these [delay]
statutes are certain to result in the McNabb rule, or some version thereof, being adopted in this
state." Seemingly, the court carried out the threat in Oliver v. State, 250 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla.
1971), where it said:
This court has intimated that a failure to bring a defendant before a magistrate would
likely result in strong action by this Court. . .[citing Milton]. We find that the totality
of the circumstances in these cases requires nullification of these convictions on account
of the failure of. . .officials to comply with. . .[Florida's delay statutes]. The ration-
ale supporting our decision may be found in the cases of.. . [McNabb and Mallog].
137 State v. Roberts, 274 So. 2d 262, 266 (Fla. App. 1973). The district court held:
In our view, . . . [Oliver did not hold] that Mcabb-Malloy is now the law of Florida.
The discussion of the circumstances ... [in Oliver] reveals the concern .. .that the
totality of ircumstances surrounding the taking of the confessions collided with the spirit
and purpose of McfNabb-Mallogi, and therefore the voluntariness of the confessions was
sufficiently doubtful so as to justify granting new trials (emphasis in original).
The supreme court reversed, but on other grounds, and did not discuss the adoption issue.
285 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973). No further supreme court cases discuss the issue.
138 People v. Howell, 60 Ill. 2d 117, 122-23, 324 N.E.2d 403, 405 (1975).
139 Id. See also People v. Hood, 59 Il. 2d 315, 324, 319 N.E.2d 802, 808 (1974). Perhaps a
step in this direction is People v. Dees, 81 Ill. App. 3d 35, 400 N.E.2d 1050, 1054 (1980),
where the court dismissed a criminal charge on the basis of an unexplained 14-day delay in
arraignment. The court based its decision on due process, however, and carefully limited the
holding to the facts of that case, which involved a misdemeanor offense.
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though, as yet, confessions are not so excluded."4 A Connecticut stat-
ute 41 seemingly incorporates McNabb-Mallo requirements for the
admissibility of a confession, although it is generally disregarded. 42
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently issued an ominous decision
on the effect of a delay violation, with a special concurrence urging that
an unexplained 57-hour delay per se warranted exclusion of a resulting
confession. 143 For the majority, which remanded the case for an expla-
nation of the delay, the determining factor was a prior Miranda viola-
tion, possibly exacerbated by the delay.' 44 Still, delay-based exclusion
was definitely countenanced.
In deciding whether to adopt McNabb-Malloy, state courts must
consider some questions. What would adoption add to existing constitu-
tional doctrines? What costs and obstacles will adoption place on law
enforcement? Should a court be making such a consequential policy
decision based on implied legislative intent?
A. MCNABB-MALLORY AND THE CONSTITUTION TODAY
Even adoption of a meaningful form of McNab-Malloy---exclusion
based solely on the illegality of a delay and unrelated to the voluntari-
ness of the challenged confession-is of questionable value. In light of
the monumental changes in constitutional doctrines after McNabb and
Mallog, were decided, little new is accomplished by adoption of the rule.
To begin with, a confession must be voluntary under the due proc-
140 People v. Williams, 68 Cal. App. 3d 36, 137 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1977).
141 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 54-1(c) (1965) reads: "Any admission, confession or state-
ment, written or oral, obtained from an accused who has not been ... presented to the first
session of the court ... or who has not been informed of his rights as provided by section 54-
lb [i.e., by a judge] shall be inadmissible."
142 See generall, Richardson, Confessions in Connecticut: What is the Current Law?, 44 CONN.
B.J. 346, 351-58 (1970).
143 State v. Wiberg, [1980] 27 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2375. The concurrence appears id. at
2376 (Rogosheske, Wahl, and Yetka, JJ., concurring). The majority declined to adopt a
"rigid" rule excluding all confessions obtained after a delay statute violation. However the
court held suppression would be required where the delay is unreasonable and it compounds
the effects of prior police misconduct. Id. at 2375. Minnesota's delay statute states: "The
effect of failure to comply with [the rule] on the admission of. . . evidence. . . is left to case-
by-case development." MINN. R. CRIM. P. 4.02. In light of the inclination of three justices to
suppress for delay alone, continued violations may spark a majority of the court to adopt
some form of McNabb-Malloq.
144 On the present record, we would probably affirm the trial court's admission of the
. . statement if the violation of the prompt araignment rule were the only reason for
suppression. However. ...
In view of the fact that the statement. . . was influenced by two separate incidents
of state misconduct-the violation of Miranda rights with regard to the statement made
at the time of arrest and the violation of the prompt arraignment rule-we feel that on
retrial the court should, absent a reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay in
arraignment, suppress that statement. ...
27 CRIM. L. REP. at 2375.
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ess clause. Although both may result in exclusion, the McNabb-Mallog
rule and the voluntariness rule involve different analyses. The volunta-
riness test requires an examination of all of the circumstances surround-
ing a confession or inculpatory statement for evidence of actual
coercion. A court scrutinizes this evidence and balances it against the
susceptibility of the suspect to determine whether the statement was
"coerced."' 45 A coerced confession violates the due process clause and is
inadmissible at trial. 146  Once the judge determines not to exclude the
statement as a matter of law, the jury may attach to it whatever weight
it deems appropriate. 147
By contrast, MNabb-Malloy triggers exclusion automatically once a
court finds an illegal delay during which the confession occurred. 148 No
evidence of voluntariness or reliability bears directly on this inquiry; 149
145 Commentators have suggested two rationales for the voluntariness test: judicial suspi-
cion of unreliable evidence and deterrence of improper interrogation methods by police.
Comment, The Coerced Confession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 313, 314
(1964). In Culombe v. Connecticut, Justice Frankfurter suggested a three-tier analysis to
determine the voluntariness of a confession: determination of the physical events surrounding
the confession, the psychological state of the defendant, and the legal conclusions to be drawn
from these conclusions and precedent. That this analysis provided an inadequate guide is
evident from the fact that the dissenters agreed on this test, but disagreed as to the conclusion
it led to on the facts of the case. 367 U.S. 568, 603, 642 (1960). See also Kamisar, A Dissent
from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fih Amendment and the Old Voluntariness
Test, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 59, 99 (1966).
ChiefJustice Warren noted in Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1959), that the
term "involuntary" was "convenient shorthand" for a "complex of values," including concern
for the "likelihood that the confession is untrue,. . . the preservation of the individual's free-
dom ofwill," and the "feeling that police must obey the law while enforcing the law." Profes-
sor Inbau has suggested that whether "voluntariness" or "trustworthiness" is the more
appropriate standard, the practical effect of each on the same fact situations will produce the
same conclusion regarding admissibility. See F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 36, at 143. But
see Kamisar, What is an "Involuntay" Confession?: Some Comments on nbau and Reid's Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 728, 738-43 (1963) (reliability is the more
accurate and desirable standard).
146 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
147 See generaly Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Meltzer, Involuntay Confessions: The
Allocation of Responsibility between Judge andJugy, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 317 (1954).
148 Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 413.
149 Circumstances evidencing coercion may also indirectly indicate the improper purpose
of a prearraignment delay, rendering it illegal and the confession inadmissible. The failure to
show such circumstances, however, should not be fatal to a motion to suppress under McNabb-
Aallop'. "[A] confession is inadmissible if made during illegal detention due to failure to
promptly carry a prisoner before a committing magistrate, whether or not the 'confession is
the result of torture, physical or psychologicalU' "Id. at 413 (citing Mitchell v. United States,
322 U.S. 65 (1943)). The cite to Mitchell was ironic because state and federal courts had read
that case to limit operation of McNabb to those confessions induced by prearraignment delay.
See, e.g., People v. Ubbes, 374 Mich. 571, 132 N.W.2d 669 (1965); Shadrick v. State, 491
S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). In Mitchell, the court faced the problem of an unreason-
able delay occurring after the suspect confessed, even though the confession itself had oc-
curred shortly after arrest. Re-interpreting Mitchell, the Upshaw Court abandoned the
inducement element and substituted an observation that, in such a case, the confession oc-
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the rule provides for a blanket exclusion. The ground for exclusion is
statutory and procedural, "quite apart from the Constitution." 5 0 Some
commentators have suggested that the operation of the rule creates an
irrebuttable presumption of involuntariness. 151 While the effect is the
same, such a characterization is misleading. As the experiences of Mich-
igan and Wisconsin show, the concept can lead to the creation of excep-
tions in the absence of "real," "reasonable," or "causal" relationships
between the delay and challenged confession. 152 The McNabb-Malloy
principle was an enforcement tool for delay statutes, not for the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. Its history clearly indicates an
intent to establish a threshold for exclusion that is lower and different in
kind from the voluntariness test: lower because delay alone is disposi-
tive, and different in kind because the trustworthiness-voluntariness of
the confession itself plays no part in its exclusion.
Even voluntary confessions are inadmissible unless the confessor
knowingly waives his rights to silence and counsel under the fifth and
sixth amendments.1 53 The police must advise arrested individuals of
these rights and secure a valid waiver before any confession induced by
custodial interrogation may be used.' 54 Before the Miranda decision,
courts considered the absence of such warnings or waiver as merely a
factor in the voluntariness analysis. 155 Not until the preliminary hear-
ing was an arrested person certain to receive the warnings.156 Thus any
curred before and not during an illegal delay. This interpretation removed the case from the
requirements of McNabb. 322 U.S. at 413. Later cases were to refer to these predelay confes-
sions as "threshold confessions." See United States v. Pettyjohn, 419 F.2d 651, 656-57 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
150 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. at 341. See also United States v. Fuller, 243 F.
Supp. 178, 181 (D.D.C. 1965), afd, 407 F.2d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1967),cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1120
(1969), where the court noted that the McNabb-Malloy rule "is not based on any question as
to whether the damaging statement was voluntary. It is not founded on any fundamental
principles of substantial justice. It is merely a sanction or a means of enforcement of Rule
5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."
151 McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEx. L.
REV. 239, 275 (1946); Note, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 738, 739 (1949).
152 See text accompaying notes 50-89 supra.
153 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Supreme Court held that, prior to the
custodial interrogation of criminal suspects, police officers must advise them of their rights to
silence and counsel, and of the consequences of waiver before any statement resulting from
the interrogation is admissible at trial. Once these rights are invoked, the police must cease
questioning.
'54 Id.
155 Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740-41 (1966).
156 Most delay statutes require judicial officers to advise arrested persons of such rights at
the preliminary hearing. See, e.g., former FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(b), quoted in United States v.
Mallory, 354 U.S. at 449-50:
The magistrate shall inform the defendant of the complaint against him and of any
affidavit filed therewith, of his right to retain counsel, of his right to request the assign-
ment of counsel if he is unable to obtain counsel, and of his right to have a preliminary
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delay in the hearing represented a potential delay in informing a suspect
of his rights. For the most part, Miranda obliterated this basis for Mc-
Nabb-Malloy. Yet several authorities continue to advance the warning
rationale because of a belief that a neutral party, not the police, should
advise a suspect of his rights and secure the waiver. 157 This argument
carries little weight, however, because a judicial officer must always re-
view the circumstances surrounding the giving and waiving of Miranda
rights, with the burden of proving validity on the government, before a
resultant confession will be admitted into evidence at trial.'58 Further-
more, Miranda warnings will not save even a voluntary confession if it is
obtained during illegal detention. 159 If police detain a person without
probable cause merely to question him, the product of the detention is
nonetheless inadmissible. 60
In the final analysis, then, McNabb-Malloy affects only voluntary
confessions by persons arrested upon probable cause who knowingly and
voluntarily waive their rights to silence and counsel after being warned
of the consequences of such a waiver. The exclusion of such evidence
costs society dearly. The benefits of such exclusion should plainly war-
rant their expense. Logically the benefits should lie in the bases for de-
lay statutes, or in the rationale for Mcabb-Malloy as an enforcement
tool for those statutes.
In their classic defense of McNabb-Mallo,7, Professors Hogan and
Snee suggested these objectives behind the enforcement of Rule 5(a) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:
examination. He shall also inform the defendant that he is not required to make a state-
ment and that any statement made by him may be used against him. The magistrate
shall allow the defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel and shall
admit the defendant to bail as provided in these rules.
Rule 5(b) is essentially incorporated in what is now FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c). See a/so, e.g., ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 109 1(b) (Smith-Hurd 1970); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 170.10 (1979).
157 Comment, supra note 52, at 53-54. Indeed a concern of the McNabb Court was that the
"the awful instruments of the criminal law" without the rule were entrusted to a "single
functionary." 318 U.S. at 343. See aLso Johnson v. State, 282 Md. at 330-32, 384 A.2d at 718-
19 (Miranda and McNab-Malloy serve different purposes), and Commonwealth v. Davenport,
471 Pa. at 284, 370 A.2d at 305 (1977) (McNabb-Mallog protects rights supplemental to those
safeguarded by Miranda).
158 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
See People v. Weaver, 179 Colo. 331, 333-34, 500 P.2d 980, 982 (1972), and Raigosa v.
State, 562 P.2d 1009, 1015 (Wyo. 1977), for instances where courts found the giving of Mi-
randa rights to vitiate any prejudice Where there was prearraignment delay. In United States
v. Poole, 495 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1974), United States v. Frazier, 419 F.2d 1161, 1164-67
(D.C. Cir. 1969), and United States v. Pettyjohn, 419 F.2d at 655-57, the courts held that the
waiver of Miranda rights constituted waiver of McNabb-Mallog rights.
159 See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 390 (1975).
See also Note, Fourth Amendrent-Admissibiliy of Statemantr Obtained.Dung Illegal Detention, 70 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 446 (1979).
160 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200.
1981]
COMMENTS
(1) arrests on suspicion, an intolerable invasion of the citizen's fundamen-
tal right to liberty, are prevented; (2) the rights accorded one accused of
crime are saved from subversion; (3) the substance of the accusatorial sys-
tem of criminal justice is preserved; (4) resort to third degree tactics is
made impossible. 61
Assuming that McNabb-Malloy effectively enforces delay statutes, such
as Rule 5(a), 162 the above examination of the type of confession left
open for exclusion reveals that current constitutional protections satisfy
the first three of these objectives. Brown v. Illinois and Dunaway v. New
York virtually eliminated the pick-up for questioning. 163 An officer of
the law must advise the accused of his rights, and counsel is available to
him upon request.'64 Despite the optimistic contentions of Professors
Hogan and Snee, resort to third-degree tactics will never be impossible
so long as the courts recognize the necessity for interrogation at all. 16 5
The only realistic way to attack the third degree consistently with the
security needs of society is to train the police, not free the guilty.' 6 6
The protection ofjudicial integrity constitutes an independent basis
for McNabb-Mallog'. Again, Hogan and Snee put it best in detailing the
"real roots" of the MNabb-Malloy rule:
Trials which are the outgrowth or fruit of the Government's illegality de-
base the processes of justice. They cannot be countenanced in any nation
which expects its citizens to esteem those processes. It is important that the
trial demonstrate the guilt of the accused, but it is important also that it
not disclose the criminality of the accuser.' 6 7
This same argument appears in many decisions on the admissibility of
evidence obtained through constitutional violations by police. 68 But
161 Hogan & Snee, supra note 2, at 27.
162 The assumption that any exclusionary rule is an effective or desirable enforcement de-
vice for procedural protections is, of course, fiercely contested. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
See general.y Wingo, Growing Disenchantment with the Exclusionag Rule, 25 Sw. L.J. 573 (1971).
163 See notes 159-61 supra.
164 See note 153 supra.
165 See generally Inbau, supra note 2.
166 The cure for third degree abuses is not in rules of exclusion of voluntary confessions
but in improved personnel and facilities for police forces so that character and efficiency
and scientific methods rather than brutality will be used to obtain evidence. If an officer
is so stupid and brutal as to use third-degree methods, he will do so, despite rules of
exclusion of voluntary confessions ....
Id. at 461.
167 Hogan & Snee, supra note 2, at 32.
In contrast, Professor Kamisar has argued that the "basic thrust of the McNabb-AMalloqy
rule. . . is to bypass conflicts over the nature of secret interrogation and to minimize both
the 'temptation' and the 'opportunity' to obtain coerced confessions." Kamisar, supra note
143, at 739-40. Hogan and Snee preferred to distinguish between the coercion concern
(which they attributed to Rule 5(a)) and the integrity concern (which they associated with
Mcgabb-Mallot). Hogan & Snee, supra note 2, at 27-33.
168 See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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the peace of mind resulting from the assertion of this abstract principle
subsides when constitutionally valid confessions fall under McNabb-Mal-
log. At some point, blanket judicial refusal to countenance even the
slightest technical violation of procedural rules by police is indistin-
guishable in its effect from sanctioning the illegal acts of those who are
freed. In the context of current constitutional protections, McNabb-Mal-
log passes that point. The only remaining target for the rule today is
prearraignment delay by itself, unrelated to constitutional rights of an
arrestee or the validity of his confession. The only beneficiaries of the
application of MNabb-Malloy are the undeniedly guilty. The integrity
argument reflects a concern for the public image of the courts. In this a
court must look to society's sense of propriety, but it must also consider
its sense of outrage. In the words of the Connecticut Supreme Court,
"Society, as well as the defendant, is entitled to equal protection of the
law and to due process of law." 169
Even in the constitutional context, the force of the judicial integrity
argument has declined. In cases such as Hams v. New York 170 and Stone v.
Powell,17' the Supreme Court has increasingly recognized that integrity
of the judiciary stems from its effectiveness as well as its purity. 172 Paral-
lel decisions on the McNabb-Mallog question in Maryland reflect this
trend also. Maryland has rejected MNabb-kfalloy for confessions used
for impeachment purposes. 173 In addition, Maryland defendants may
not invoke MNabb-Mallog for federal habeas corpus, 174 which suggests
that judicial integrity plays a limited role in the rule, even in a state
ostensibly committed to its meaningful application.
169 State v. Zusanskas, 132 Conn. 450, 460, 45 A.2d 289, 293 (1945). See notes 206-12 infra.
170 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (allowing use of Miranda-violative statements for impeachment
purposes).
171 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1975): "While courts, of course, must ever be concerned with pre-
serving the integrity of the judicial process, this concern has limited force as a justification for
the exclusion of highly probative evidence." See also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,458-
59 n.35 (1975): "[T]he 'prime purpose' of the [exclusionary] rule, ifnot the sole one, is to deter
future unlawful police conduct." (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 347 (1974)).
172 There are several answers to the assertion that courts should exclude illegally seized
evidence in order to preserve their integrity. . . .[W]hile it is quite true that courts are
not to be participants in "dirty business," neither are they to be ethereal vestal virgins of
another world, so determined to be like Caesar's wife, Calpurnia, that they cease to be
effective forums in which both those charged with committing criminal acts and the
society which makes the charge rfiay have a fair trial in which relevant competent evi-
dence is received in order to determine whether or not the charge is true. As Mr. Justice
Stone noted in McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99 (1927), "[a] criminal prosecution
is more than a game in which the Government may be checkmated and the game lost
merely because its officers have not played according to rule."
California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 924-25 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This dissent
provides an incisive history of the application of the exclusionary rule in the Supreme Court.
173 Harris v. State, 42 Md. App. 248, 400 A.2d 6 (1979).
174 Smith v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 477 F. Supp. 500 (D. Md. 1979).
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Thus a state accomplishes little in adopting McNabb-Malloy that is
not accomplished by existing constitutional doctrines. The only remain-
ing target is delay itself and not the danger such a delay might pose to
the confession-related rights of the defendant.
Of course prompt arraignment safeguards other interests of sus-
pects, such as the determination of and opportunity to post bail and the
right not to be deprived of liberty for longer than legally allowable or
necessary. Excluding constitutionally valid confessions for the purpose
of enforcing these rights is irrational. Even assuming such exclusion
would ultimately protect all arrestees from illegal delays whether the
police seek a confession or not, the costs are prohibitive and the link
between the confession and the statutory violation is tenuous at best.
When evidence is seized by an illegal search, the illegality is the immediate
and proximate cause which produces the evidence, but when the illegality,
if any, consists merely in questioning the defendant, having failed first to
take him before a magistrate, the confession, if voluntarily made, is only
remotely, if at all, connected with the fact that the officer disobeyed the
statute. 175
The more rational, cost-effective way to enforce delay statutes
would be to punish those who violate them, not reward those who hap-
pen to confess after such a violation at society's expense. Whether this
were done administratively, legislatively, or judicially, sounder results
would be achieved.
B. PROBLEMS WITH ADOPTING MCNABB-M-ALLORY
McNabb-Malloy developed because of the potential for abuse during
a prearraignment delay. 176 Later constitutional doctrines, however,
largely have removed this danger, leaving delay as the only target of the
rule. By excluding confessions for the limited, and mostly unrelated,
purpose of deterring delays, courts incur important problems and costs.
A major problem is administration. Courts have difficulty in determin-
ing the elements of unnecessary or unreasonable delay. Courts may be
unable to draw a line that allows for considerations of individual justice
and still provides sufficient certainty to serve as a guide to law enforce-
ment officials. Such a guide may necessarily be so restrictive that it im-
pairs effective law enforcement. Public response to the rule poses
another problem which takes on added significance in state court sys-
175 State v. Folkes, 174 Or. 568, 589, 150 P.2d 17, 25, ceri. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944). The
United States Supreme Court also rejected this sort of "but-for" causation argument as a sole
basis for exclusion in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975).
176 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. at 343. But see Inbau, supra note 2, at 454-59, for
the contention that the original federal delay statutes originally were passed not to protect the
accused, but rather to curtail excessive expenses claimed by officials during an unnecessary
delay in bringing a suspect to court.
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tems with an elected or periodically voter-affirmed judiciary. State
courts must also examine the fundamental and practical differences be-
tween the needs and resources of law enforcement officials at state and
federal levels, especially as they regard the necessity of interrogation.
Administen'ng the Rule
A per se Mcabb-Malloy rule may use a reasonableness test, as in
Montana 77 and in Maryland (for delays of less than twenty-four
hours), 178 or it may rely on a time standard such as in Pennsylvania.1 79
Each test involves different problems.
Reasonableness
The federal courts, during their experiment with Mcabb-Malloy,
applied the unreasonable/unnecessary delay test.' 80 Under the due
process test, both state and federal courts determined the reasonableness
of a delay as part of the voluntariness inquiry.' 8 ' In addition, false im-
prisonment charges brought under delay statutes often necessitate a de-
termination of the reasonableness of a delay even if no confession has
occurred. 18 2 Despite some mixed and contradictory use of terms by fed-
eral and state courts, general patterns are discernible in judicial atti-
tudes on the reasonableness of prearraignment delays.
The reasonableness of a delay usually depends on the court's per-
ception of its purpose. Important factors include the reasons for the de-
lay, the conduct of officers during the delay, the likely effect of the delay
upon the particular arrestee, and the length of the delay. The weight
given to one factor depends largely upon the presence or absence of the
other factors. 18 3 For example, while courts typically permit long delays
177 See text accompanying notes 126-32 supra.
178 See text accompanying notes 100-13 supira.
179 See text accompanying notes 114-25 supra.
180 See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 243 F. Supp. 178 (D.D.C. 1965), afd, 407 F.2d 1199
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1120 (1969).
181 See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741 (1966); People v. Dees, 81 Ill. App.
3d 35, 400 N.E.2d 1050 (1980).
182 Comparison of what may be "unreasonable" for false imprisonment and confession
purposes is difficult. A judge will determine reasonableness for a confession, while a jury
usually decides the issue in false imprisonment cases as an element of a claim for damages.
Occasionally, when the facts are undisputed in an action for false imprisonment, ajudge may
determine whether a particular delay violated the applicable delay statute. See cases col-
lected in Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 966, 991-1004 (1964).
183 "No hard and fast rule can govern as to what constitutes an unnecessary delay and each
case must be determined on its own facts and circumstances." Williams v. United States, 273
F.2d 781, 798 (9th Cir. 1960). State cases to the same effect include People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.
2d 274, 178 N.E.2d 299 (1961); State v. O'Kelley, 175 Neb. 798, 124 N.W.2d 211 (1963); State
v. Fry, 245 N.W.2d 878 (N.D. 1976); and Richmond v. State, 554 P.2d 1217 (Wyo. 1976).
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due to the unavailability of a judicial officer, 184 they frown upon even
brief delays for the purpose of extracting a confession from the accused
before his arraignment. 18 5 The courts are tolerant of delays attributable
to administrative processing, such as fingerprinting, photographing, and
the like.18 6 They generally countenance delays for arranging medical
treatment of the accused, 187 for procuring necessary transportation, 188 or
for satisfying conflicting demands on an officer's time, 189 provided the
officers involved exercise due diligence thereafter in bringing the ac-
cused before a judicial officer.
The courts have failed to draw a distinct line for delay due to inter-
rogation of the accused. Usually, the courts sanction delays for an im-
mediate determination of whether to release the accused.190 Checking a
suspect's story is another legitimate practice.191 But when the court de-
184 United States v. Mendoza, 473 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1973); Commonwealth v. Mayhew,
297 Ky. 172, 178 S.W.2d 928 (1943); State v. Plantz, 155 W. Va. 24, 180 S.E.2d 614 (1971).
185 Coleman v. United States, 313 F.2d 576 (D.C. Cir. 1962); People v. Stroble, 36 Cal. 2d
615, 226 P.2d 330, afd sub nom. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1951).
186 Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 569, 319 A.2d 419 (1974) (pre-Davenport). See also
Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. at 413.
187 Commonly, such cases involve delays while the accused is hospitalized for injuries re-
ceived during the crime or his capture. See People v. Lane, 56 Cal. 2d 773, 366 P.2d 57, 16
Cal. Rptr. 801 (1961); Green v. State, 257 Ind. 244, 274 N.E.2d 267 (1971); State v. George,
93 N.H. 408, 43 A.2d 256 (1945).
In United States v. Bear Killer the court found reasonable the time taken by police for the
accused to sober up and for his transportation to a commissioner 100 miles away. 534 F.2d
1253 (8th Cir. 1976). Cf. Warren v. State, 385 A.2d 137 (Del. 1978) (uniform eight-hour
prearraignment sobering-up period held unreasonable because arbitrary). See note 99 supra.
188 Complicated travel arrangements or arrests made far from a committing official con-
tributed to the reasonableness of prearraignment delays in United States v. Edwards, 539
F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1976); and Common-
wealth v. Nickol, 476 Pa. 75, 381 A.2d 873 (1977).
In People v. Mallett, 45 Ill. 2d 388, 259 N.E.2d 241 (1969), the accused's oral confession
occurred five hours after arrest, but before a magistrate was available. Finding that a three-
hour delay in transporting the accused to locate people and places mentioned in the confes-
sion was proper, the court admitted a written confession signed eight hours after arrest.
See also United States v. Standing Soldier, 538 F.2d 196 (8th Cir. 1976), where a blizzard
and poor road conditions justified a delay of two days in arraignment. The Omnibus Crime
Act of 1968 expressly provides for travel delays. See note 7 supra.
189 Commonwealth v. Darden, 364 N.E.2d 1092 (Mass. App. 1977). See also Hayes v.
Mitchell, 69 Ala. 452 (1881).
190 State v. Johnson, 249 La. 950, 192 So. 2d 135 (1966), cerl denied, 388 U.S. 923 (1967);
State v. Phillips, 29 Wis. 2d 521, 139 N.W.2d 41 (1966).
191 See United States v. Devall, 462 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Commonwealth v. Whitson,
464 Pa. 101, 334 A.2d 653 (1975).
An investigative delay of 24 hours was held reasonable in Quinn v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 101,
183 N.W.2d 64 (1971), where the accused confessed to eight crimes in the first half-hour after
arrest. Cf Commonwealth v. Morton, 475 Pa. 374, 380 A.2d 769 (1977), where nine hours of
investigative delay was held "unnecessary."
Courts have also upheld delays for locating stolen goods, see State v. Sings, 35 N.C. App.
1, 240 S.E.2d 471 (1978), and for placing the location of the alleged crime, see Mares v. Hill,
118 Utah 484, 222 P.2d 811, cert. denied, 341 U.S. 933 (1950). In State v. Wallace, 59 Wis. 2d
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termines that the police intended to extract a confession, it is likely to
exclude the resultant confession as involuntary or as the product of un-
necessary or unreasonable delay. 192 Exclusion is less likely when the ac-
cused manifests a willingness to be interrogated, such as when he
requests a polygraph examination. 193 Most jurisdictions do not find
that delays attributable to requests by the accused are unreasonable.
Inextricably tied up in a reasonableness determination is the con-
duct of officials during the delay in question, particularly when defense
counsel challenges the state's asserted reason for the delay. Good treat-
ment of the accused, 194 time allowed for sleep and consultation with
relatives, and relatively little actual questioning' 95 of the suspect are all
circumstances which will work against claims that the purpose of a de-
lay is unreasonable. Conversely, intensive or violent questioning, 196
deprivation of sleep or food, and isolation 197 are examples of circum-
stances suggesting that a delay is unreasonable. The weight accorded
police conduct during a delay will vary with the susceptibility of the
particular suspect to coercive pressure. An individual with experience in
the criminal process is less likely to be prejudiced or have his "will over-
borne" by delay than a first-time offender. The courts often take this
factor, as well as the age and education of the accused, into account. 198
Theoretically, under MNabb-Mallory the susceptibility factor should
carry little weight because the inquiry is not about voluntariness. Still, a
court can infer the purpose of a delay from police conduct toward a
person known to be particularly susceptible. Thus, the factor does have
some limited relevance.
Length is probably the most important and least concrete determi-
nant of a delay's reasonableness. As a general rule, the relevant period
66, 207 N.W.2d 855 (1973), the court found a three-day delay to be reasonable in light of the
difficulty of investigating the crime committed seven years before the arrest.
192 In Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), Justice Frankfurter said that it was at this
point that interrogation became a "suction process" and that resulting confessions were "the
reverse of voluntary." Id. at 53. See Thomas v. United States, 394 F.2d 247 (10th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 931 (1969), and State v. Phillips, 29 Wis. 2d 521, 139 N.W.2d 41 (1966).
193 Courts also have tended to uphold the reasonableness of investigative delays when the
suspect turns himself in, or confesses spontaneously to crimes unrelated to the one under
investigation. See Smith v. State, 252 Ind. 425, 249 N.E.2d 493 (1969).
194 Benign treatment of the accused was a factor justifying delays in State v. Wyman, 97
Idaho 486, 597 P.2d 531 (1976), and State v. Hausen, 225 N.W.2d 343 (Iowa 1975).
195 See State v. Estrada, 63 Wis. 2d 476, 217 N.W.2d 359 (1974).
196 See People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963), and Commonwealth
v. Cherry, 457 Pa. 201, 321 A.2d 611 (1975).
Evidence of such conduct is more likely to go to the voluntariness of a confession rather
than to the reasonableness of a delay during which it was obtained. See People v. Angello, 48
Misc. 2d 550, 265 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1965).
197 See Thomas v. North Carolina, 447 F.2d 1320 (4th Cir. 1971).
198 See id. at 1322.
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of time in measuring the length of a delay is that elapsing between arrest
and confession. 199 In the overwhelming majority of states, the reason-
able length of a delay is a matter entirely within the discretion of the
court.20 0 Just as a legitimate purpose, such as administrative processing,
will support a long delay, a short delay will mitigate against the exclu-
sionary impact of a questionable practice.
The law enforcement officer will find little guidance from such dis-
tinctions. Many of the important reasonableness factors are discovera-
ble only through hindsight, leaving the officer in an untenable position.
The perceptions and biases of individual trial judges may also affect the
relative weight of these factors.20 The result in the federal courts was
uncertainty, not continuity, as minor factual differences distinguished
cases, confusing police and other judges.202
199 See United States v. Montes-Zarate, 552 F.2d 1330, 1331 (9th Cir. 1977); Lewis v. State,
296 So. 2d 575, 577 (Fla. App. 1974); Dukes v. State, 109 Ga. App. 825, 829, 137 S.E.2d 532,
535 (1964); State v. Johnson, 383 A.2d 1012, 1017 (R.I. 1978).
200 The judge's discretion is circumscribed only in states in which a flat, time-based stan-
dard applies.
201 One of the significant problems encountered in the federal courts with the McNabb-
Mallo rule was the reluctance of some judges to apply it. One federal judge wrote:
With all due deference to the Supreme Court, and especially to Mr. Justice Felix Frank-
furter, the author of ... [McNabb] we are constrained to state that we entertain grave
doubts that this recently promulgated rule of evidence will result in any improvement to
the administration of criminal justice .... This new rule inures to the benefit of the
guilty rather than the innocent and will seriously impair the work of law enforcement
officers.
United States v. Haupt, 136 F.2d 661, 671 (7th Cir. 1943).
Some federal courts refused to believe that the Supreme Court had intended to create a
standard so unrelated to the voluntariness test of the past. For example, in Ruhl v. United
States, 148 F.2d 173, 175 (10th Cir. 1945), the court wrote of McNabb, "[A] careful reading of
the case leads to the conclusion that failure to take the accused before an arraigning officer
was not the reason the confession was held inadmissible. The real basis of the decision was
the coercive and unfair treatment to which the defendant was subjected." See also Note, sufira
note 6, at 763-64.
202 Before reciting precedent to support a reasonableness decision under McNabb-Mallei,
one court cautioned:
In the interest of clarity, however, it is desirable to say something about the state of the
decisions in the various circuits on the question as to what constitutes unnecessary delay.
There are numerous decisions on this point in the District of Columbia Circuit, because
in the District of Columbia common law felonies are prosecuted in the Federal court.
The decisions are inconsistent with each other, depending very largely, I venture to say,
on the composition of the panels of judges that decided the various cases.
United States v. Fuller, 243 F. Supp. 178, 181 (D.D.C. 1965), afd, 407 F.2d 1199 (D.C. Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1120 (1969).
In Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 343, 384 A.2d 709, 725 (1978), Chief Judge Murphy
wrote in dissent:
Defining just what delay in presenting an arrested person before a judicial officer was
'unnecessary' predictably caused great problems to courts required to grapple with such
a vague and elusive concept. Because the rule was neither sensible nor clear, because it
was unrealistic in application, unworkable in practice, and led to widely varying results,
almost all states . . . rejected it.
See a/so Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchnan?, 14 AM. U.L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1964).
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ime-Based Standards
Time standards, while easily administered, are arbitrary. In his dis-
sent in Johnson v. State, Maryland's adoption decision, Judge Orth
phrased the objection this way:
[T]o exclude a voluntary confession from evidence merely because a police
officer has presented an arrestee before a judicial officer a fraction of a
second too late under the mandate of the rule, no matter what the reason,
debases the judicial process. It is so patently against the general public
and sensible administration of criminal justice that I am not the least bit
persuaded by the arguments advance by the majority. 203
Time-based exclusion makes judges, not to mention police, slaves to the
clock. In adopting it, courts abdicate their judicial function and make it
possible for a confessed killer to go free because someone was late.
To its credit, the time-based standard focuses on delay alone as the
triggering factor. Thus it relates more directly to the remaining unad-
dressed concern of delay statutes, which is prearraignment delay, not
confessions. However, it still relies on the exclusion of confessions as the
operative enforcement device for the statute. Such an approach con-
tains the flaws discussed previously: it deprives society of the benefit of
highly probative, constitutionally valid confessions without an express
legislative basis for doing so. When state legislators mean for statutory
violations to affect the admissibility of confessions, they have not been
hesitant to do so. Some state statutes specify that the confessions of
juveniles are inadmissible if special procedures are not followed upon
their arrest.20 4 Other direct expressions of legislative intent regarding
the admissibility of confessions are not unknown to the law.20 5 The ab-
sence of an express mandate to exclude in ordinary delay statutes is
therefore significant, and the courts should heed it. If McNabb-Malloy is
to be adopted regardless, then the time-based standard makes the most
administrative and doctrinal sense.
. Both a reasonableness version and a time-based version of McNabb-
Malloy involve considerable costs. The former is often unworkable, and
the latter is dangerously arbitrary. In light of the insignificant remain-
ing utility of McNabb-Mallogy with regard to confessions, the decision to
incur such costs is a drastic one.
Public Response to McNabb-Mallog,
Any court must be concerned with the public reaction to its deci-
sions. Our legal system depends on society's perception of its continued
203 282 Md. 314, 341, 384 A.2d 709, 724 (Orth, J., dissenting).
204 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1109 (Supp. 1979-80).
205 See, e.g., TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 38.22 (1979). See also McCormick, supra
note 151, at 251-54; and note 141 supra.
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effectiveness for its survival. This is the mirror image of the judicial
integrity argument put forth to support adoption of exclusionary rules,
including McNabb-Malloy. 20 6 In the absence of a showing of potential
coercion, the public is apt to perceive exclusion of confessions and rever-
sals of convictions as irrational, or at least overly solicitous of the rights
of a confessed criminal at the expense of society. Furthermore, such de-
velopments can breed disrespect for the law and encourage crime by
making convictions less certain.20 7 As Professor Inbau has noted:
Our civil liberties cannot exist in a vacuum. Alongside of them we must
have a stable society, a safe society; otherwise there will be no medium in
which to exercise such rights and liberties. To have these liberties without
safety of life, limb, and property is a meaningless thing. Individual civil
liberties, considered apart from their relationship to public safety, and se-
curity, are like labels on empty bottles208
Public outrage in response to adoption may have more direct effects
than a long range deterioration of esteem for the judicial function or for
the laws. State legislators are as capable as their federal counterparts of
206 See text accompanying note 167 supra.
207 In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), Justice Brandeis wrote in dissent:
"In a government of law, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe
the law scrupulously .... If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."
Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger responded:
No one can take issue with the Brandeis thesis, but there is another side to the coin.
If a majority--or even a substantial minority-of the people in any given commu-
nity. . . come to believe that law enforcement is being frustrated by what laymen call
"technicalities," there develops a sour and bitter feeling that is psychologically and socio-
logically unhealthy....
I do not challenge these rules of law. But I do suggest that we may have come the
full circle from the place where Brandeis stood, and that a vast number of people are
losing respect for law and the administration of justice because they think that the Sup-
pression Doctrine [the exclusionary rule] is defeating justice.
... [W]e must remember that the rule was made to protect the integrity of law
enforcement, not to cripple it.
Burger, supra note 202, at 21-22 (citing Sondern, Take the Handcuji Of Our Police!, READERS
DIGEST, Sept. 1964, at 64-68).
The 16-year-old statement is certainly not outdated. Consider this 1980 news article:
FEAR OF CRIME HAUNTS THE U.S.
Fear of crime is as American as the Son of Sam or the Hillside Strangler. And this
real anxiety, according to a new study of public attitudes in the United States, has
turned more than half of the nation into a pack of cautious, gun-toting citizens who keep
their doors locked and their dress inconspicuous to avoid becoming crime statistics. Four
out of ten Americans surveyed say they are "highly fearful" that they will be victims of
murder, robbery, rape or assault. ...
The study [a 163-page report by Research and Forecasts, Inc. of New York] also
confirms other polls that show that the criminal courts have lost the respect of the public,
and it indicates an increasingly strong punitive mood.
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 29, 1980, at 85.
208 Inbau, Law Enforcement, The Courts, and Individual Civil Liberties, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
OUR TIME 96, 134 (A. Howard ed. 1965).
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passing legislation similar to the Omnibus Crime Act.20 9 In addition,
the elected or voter-approved state judge may question whether the Mc-
Nabb-Mallor principle merits the uproar where the result on procedure
after legislative reversal will be nil.210 Concededly, obscure legal issues
seldom spark such widespread interest as to make popular acceptance
an important factor in a court's decision. Yet on the federal level the
McNabb-Mallogy rule was for more than twenty years the most hotly con-
tested issue in federal criminal procedure. 211 The debate it inspired was
intense; the arguments were of broad, emotional appeal. Senator Er-
vin's oft quoted remark illustrates some of the ferocity of the attack on
McNabb-Mallog: "Frankly, I believe that in recent years enough has
been done for those who murder, rape and rob; and that it is about time
for Congress to do something for those who do not wish to be murdered,
or raped, or robbed. '212
Of course constitutional rights of individuals should not depend on
the passions of the majority. But McNabb-Mallogr involves no constitutional
rights. The doctrine emanates from delay statutes, which almost never
expressly mandate exclusion to enforce them. The decision to adopt has
crucial consequences. Language quoted throughout this comment illus-
trates the controversy and acrimonious debate adoption engenders.- The
heavy costs of adoption, the doubtful modem necessity for extraconsti-
tutional exclusionary protection, and the intuitive irrationality of exclu-
sion for reasons so unrelated to the confession itself should give a court
pause before deciding a legislature intended such a result by implica-
tion. In the original McNabb decision, the Supreme Court erred, and
Congress eventually abolished the rule after twenty-five years of stormy
and confusing jurisprudence. State courts should learn from the federal
experience.
Federal versus State Necessity for Interrogation
The Supreme Court has noted the necessity for interrogation of sus-
pects in criminal investigations. In Culombe v. Connecticut, Justice Frank-
furter, the author of the McNabb opinion, wrote:
Despite modem advances in the technology of crime detection, offenses
frequently occur about which things cannot be made to speak. And where
there cannot be found innocent human witnesses to such offenses, nothing
remains-if police investigation is not to be balked before it has fairly be-
209 See notes 7, 28-31 & accompanying text supra.
210 See Beck & Reese, Judge Bird on Trial, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 23, 1978; at 53; Bird Hunt,
TIME, Oct. 2, 1978, at 53; Reeves, BirdHunting in Calfornia; Attempt to Remove R.E Birdas Chief
Justice, ESQUIRE, Sept. 12, 1978, at 7; Justice Bird's rulings in criminal cases, and the ensuing
controversy, drew nationwide attention.
211 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Criminal § 72, at 63 (1969).
212 104 CONG. REC. 17085 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1958).
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gun-but to seek out guilty witnesses and ask them questions, witnesses
that is, who are suspected of knowing something about the offense precisely
because they are suspected of implication in it.
2 t 3
Adoption of the rule unavoidably creates additional uncertainty or un-
warranted arbitrary limits on the interrogation process. 214 These ad-
verse effects affect all interrogations whether or not a court later finds
that they occurred during an unreasonable delay. The Supreme Court
determined that the benefits of MNabb-Mallogr outweighed these effects
on the interrogation process in the federal law enforcement system, but
clearly recognized that states might come to different conclusions re-
garding their criminal systems. 215
Federal law enforcement agencies may bring large amounts of spe-
cialized equipment and manpower to bear on fewer, more specialized
crimes. The ability of federal agencies to gather circumstantial evidence
reduces the importance of interrogation of suspects in solving crimes.
Yet a state court might determine that local police, by the more limited
capacity of their resources and the nature and number of the crimes
they handle, depend on interrogation more than do their federal coun-
terparts.216 Murderers, rapists, and robbers would seem to produce less
extrinsic, tangible evidence than narcotics dealers, if only because the
former set of crimes generally involve fewer people and are repeated less
systematically. Crimes that states prosecute, for the same reasons, may
involve fewer innocent parties to serve as witnesses, increasing the need,
as Justice Frankfurter noted, for the interrogation of suspects. On the
basis of this need, and especially in light of the strong constitutional
protections currently afforded arrested persons, a state court should con-
sider carefully whether the effect of a McNabb-Mallory rule is too severe
on state law enforcement for adoption by judicial fiat, even if the court
believes that the rule might once have been workable in the federal sys-
tem. In the absence of express legislative intent, adoption risks serious
harm to important state interests.
213 367 U.S. 568, 571 (1961).
214 See text accompanying notes 177-205 supra.
215 In Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 197 (1951), the Court made explicit what it had
implied in McNabb: that it would not apply McNab-Malloq in reviewing state criminal prose-
cutions for due process violations.
216 Professor Inbau cites the interesting case of Greenwell v. United States, 336 F.2d 962
(D.C. Cir. 1964), where FBI agents, when involved in a "local" rather than "national" crime
case, found themselves caught in a McNabb-Malloy trap. The example tends to undercut
those who reason that "If the FBI could live with McNabb-Mallog, so can other law enforce-
ment bodies." F. INBAU &J. REID, supra note 36, at 151 n.18. See a/so Inbau, More About Public




State courts reviewing their stands on McNabb-Malloy must con-
sider not only whether to adopt the rule, but to what extent. Adopting a
causation formula or a reasonableness standard leads to sporadic or inef-
fective application of the rule as evidenced in Michigan and Wisconsin.
The per se rule based on flat time standards addresses the administrative
problems, but may encourage police to continue their interrogations up
to the limit in more cases, and abdicates the judicial function. Still, the
rules in Pennsylvania and Maryland most accurately reflect the basic
concerns of delay statutes. Perhaps a court should not decide between
any of these options for enforcement. Although delay statutes express
legislative intent, most of them provide no suggestions for methods of
enforcement or remedies.2t 7 The extension of a drastic remedy normally
reserved for constitutional violations is a tenuously justified exercise of
judicial power, especially in light of the reaction to the original rule in
Congress.218
Furthermore, current constitutional law addresses many of the orig-
inal concerns underlying delay statutes, obviating the need for reliance
on a doctrine of implied statutory exclusion. The Supreme Court now
reads the fourth amendment practically to forbid the "pick-up" for
questioning.219 Once an accused is in custody, Miranda warnings must
be given, understood, and voluntarily waived before a subsequent con-
fession is admissible.220 In any case, the confession must be voluntary.22'
The constitutional rulings undercut the delay statutes' protective func-
tion, which by itself supports a weak case for incurring the social cost of
excluding the remaining confessions. 222
Yet the deterrent goal of McNabb-Mallog retains its validity with
regard to prearraignment delays per se. The time one is kept at a police
station illegally, whether or not he confesses, should be eliminated. But
McNabb-Malloy applies only where police obtain a confession; even then
it raises the general doubts about the deterrent value of the exclusionary
rule.223 An increasing number of courts are impatient with increased
violations of delay statutes and, faced with a lack of legislative response,
are considering action. 224 The recent state decisions to adopt McNabb-
217 See statutes cited in notes 33-34 supra.
218 See text accompanying notes 28-31 supra.
219 See text accompanying notes 159-60 upra.
220 See text accompanying notes 153-54 supra.
221 See text accompanying notes 145-47 sura.
222 See text accompanying notes 157-58 supra.
223 See note 162 supra.
224 See notes 133-44 & accompanying text supra. The same impetus ought to spark legisla-
tive searches for more efficient alternatives than cNabb-Mfallog to stem police disregard for
1981]
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Malloy assume that exclusion is the only viable way to deter viola-
tions.2 25 The costs of MNabb-Malloy, however, far outweigh its utility,
and its effect falls short of its goal. More careful analysis should engen-
der greater resistance to Mc~labb-Mallog in the state courts in the future.
Once it is determined that the problem warrants judicial rather than
legislative or administrative action, other wiser possibilities should sug-
gest themselves to judges concerned with striking a workable balance
between the pressures for law enforcement and police control.226
JERALD P. KEENE
delay statutes. See generally Roche, A Viable Substitute for the Exclusionagy Rule: A Civil Rights
Appeals Board, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 223 (1973). See also Burger, supra note 202.
225 In promulgating the Johnson rule, the Maryland Court of Appeals called the exclusion-
ary rule "perhaps" the most effective device for curbing illegal prearraignment delays. 282
Md. at 326, 384 A.2d at 716. Other adopting state courts implemented the rule with no
discussion of alternatives. State v. Benbo, 174 Mont. 252, 570 P.2d 894; Commonwealth v.
Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417.
226 The balance must recognize the importance of redressing crime.
A criminal justice system, by its very nature, frequently involves the delicate balancing of
competing interests. A society dedicated to human liberty must be ever vigilant that a
suspect never be compelled to incriminate himself. That same society, legitimately con-
cerned with protecting itself from predators, must also be sensitive to the value of an
admission or confession, properly obtained, as sometimes indispensable evidence of guilt.
But for the confession in the case at bar, a brutal sexual assault and strangulation of a
ten-year-old girl might have gone forever unredressed. . ..
Chaney v. State, 42 Md. App. 563, 563-64, 402 A.2d 86, 88 (1979).
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